Response to E____

(Thought I'd share--because of its apologetic content that ought to be of general interest--an email I just sent to a young atheist with whom I share a mutual friend...)

Hi E____

I'm writing you at the request of K_____. She indicates that you consider yourself an atheist, either because you see no reason to believe in God, because in your experience God is a crutch for people with a need to believe in Him, or both. The perspective I will share with you is that of a biologist who is also a philosopher and historian of science.

As I see it, my need is not to believe in God, but to align my beliefs with reality. This is, of course, what is meant by truth--when things really are the way we believe them to be. Were there any reason to disbelieve in God (or to believe in some other god or gods), were there any evidence on the side of atheism or polytheism (or Buddhism, Hinduism, or Islam), I would pursue such reasons and evidence in search of the truth.

There is no question in my mind that the Christian worldview uniquely matches the reality of the universe in which we live. While I could take the time to identify fatal logical, scientific, or historical flaws in any of a number of other worldviews, I'll make the case that Christianity much better matches reality than does scientific naturalism/atheism. And I'll do this for two reasons, first because I suspect the latter is the view that you espouse (rather than, say, Hinduism), and second because it's the alternate worldview I've researched the most. It is, after all, the great cosmogenic myth of our time (though, despite its present popularity, its tenure among the great ideas is astonishingly short) and what was uncritically offered as indoctrination throughout much of my formal educational experience.

To repeat, as a scientist and philosopher of science, I see Christianity as the accurate understanding of the world in which we live, and far superior in its explanatory power to scientific naturalism. The issue is not at all close. That is, whereas you ask "How can any well-educated scientist believe in God?" I have exactly the opposite query: "How can any but the most superficially educated scientist embrace the belief that there is no God?"

In other words, while the content of our beliefs--yours and mine--are exactly opposite on this issue, the strength of our respective beliefs is equally great. The difference is that I have spent a lifetime (and much longer than your lifetime) examing the evidence for both sides of the argument. I have been intentional in reading the works of atheists (ancient and modern), and have critically examined the reasoning and evidence offered by them. Have you done the same for Christianity? Have you read, for example, The Case for a Creator (Strobel) or Mere Christianity (C.S. Lewis), The Creator and the Cosmos (Hugh Ross) or The Design of Life (Dembski and Wells)? I have read The God Delusion and The Greatest Show on Earth (both by Richard Dawkins), A Letter to a Christian Nation (Sam Harris), etc. (So flawed are some of the arguments therein that they provide abundant examples of both formal and informal fallacies for the college course I teach in Critical Thinking.) The point is, if you really want to understand a different worldview or belief system, read, comprehend, and wrestle with the very best books by proponents of that system.

Although I see a plethora of problems with scientific naturalism and the failed evolutionary theory that (for many) makes it plausible, I will have to limit my remarks to a few. (I'll be happy to interact with you, take questions or comments, and keep a dialogue going, but for an opening salvo I'll try not to be too lengthy. For one thing, the more I write, the more I run the danger of addressing a belief you don't actually hold. I'll address some misconceptions very common in our culture today, and you'll have to forgive me if you don't share some of these misconceptions.)

Most scientists spend all of their time studying phenomena within the ongoing processes of our world, and can happily do so without reference to God. But no matter how well we come to understand the movements of the starry heavens, the behavior of quarks, or the ecological relationships of a particular biome, there are bigger, more fundamental questions the answers to which science (if properly understood) can contribute. Of some 9 or 10 of these that come immediately to mind, let me briefly discuss two: the existence of the universe and the design of the universe for advanced life. (Other big questions include the existence of order in the universe, the origin of life, the diversity of life, the origin of the information in the genetic code, the origin of irreducibly complex biological systems, the existence of human consciousness...)

Note at the outset that theism (and particularly Christian theism) has been the default understanding--the view with adequate explanatory power--for each and all of these big questions throughout the history of Western thought. Note also that the very modern idea that atheism/scientific naturalism is somehow reaonable arose because Darwin offered a naturalistic explanation for just one of these big questions--the diversity of life. To put it another way, scientific naturalism has singularly failed to offer adequate explanations for these other big questions (and its attempts to do so lead to naturalism's most embarrassing errors in reasoning, ignoring of evidence, and such).

When we come to explaining the existence of the universe, we arrive at big problems both for naturalism generally and for evolutionary theory in particular. Darwin proposed his theory--which, according to Richard Dawkins, made it possible to be "an intellectually fulfilled atheist"--under the assumption that the universe itself was eternal (thus offering natural selection a nearly infinite amount of time to work its wonders). We now know this necessary assumption to be wrong; the universe had a beginning a mere 13.6 billion years ago, and the Cause of that beginning is outside the matter, energy, space, and time of the universe.

For statisticians and mathematicians, the realization that the universe had such a recent beginning is fatal not only for neo-Darwinism but for any naturalistic explanation for life's diversity. But more fundamentally, this 20th-century discovery represents powerful support for the Cosmological Argument for God's existence (that is, in philosophical terms, that the universe is contingent and its cause a necessary, eternal Being) and for the claims of Judeo-Christian scriptures written 3500 years ago. Indeed, general relativity and big bang cosmology are the most rigorously tested ideas in physics precisely because physicists and astronomers recognized (and found distastful) their theological implications and sought to refute them (through steady-state, oscillating-universe, and other alternate theories).

The past several decades have also yielded (primarily among physicists and astronomers) the discovery that the universe itself and our location in it are incredibly fine-tuned to allow for the existence of life and of intelligent life. This recognition has been dubbed the "Anthropic Principle," and rarely does a week go by without there being discovered yet another parameter of the entire universe or of a more local aspect of it whose value is set in the extremely narrow range (among the broad range of possible values) that makes human life possible. Ignoring for the time being the separate (huge) question of how life originated, the probability of even one life-support planet in the universe (even given the existence of 100 billion trillion stars and the possibility that there are planets associated with many of them) is zero. Astrophysicists Fred Hoyle and Chandra Wickramasinge put it this way:

The speculations of The Origin of Species turned out to be wrong... It is ironic that the scientific facts throw Darwin out but leave William Paley, a figure of fun to the scientific world for more than a century, still in the tournament with a chance of being the ultimate winner.

In the words of Stephen Hawking,

It would be very difficult to explain why the universe should have begun in just this way, except as the act of a God who intended to create beings like us.

The currently popular way of trying to get around the clearly theistic implications of big bang cosmology and the anthropic principle is to postulate an infinite number of other universes, each with different parameter values, such that we just happened to have won the lottery to end all lotteries. Besides there being absolutely no evidence (and no possibility of there ever being evidence) for such a situation, this metaphysical view does not do away with the need for a Creator, but only pushes that problem up a level. Moreover, while such a view might address the fundamental anthropic parameters (those that apply to our universe as a whole), it does nothing to explain the much greater number of local fine-tuned parameters (the crafting of our galaxy and solar system for life support).

Again, I could address each of the other big questions of metaphysics in turn, and we would see that all of the latest scientific discoveries powerfully support the Christian worldview and leave the naturalistic worldview without explanations. But there are more basic--logical--problems for scientific naturalism.

Modern science--the continuous, progressive endeavor that has cured many diseases, landed humans on the moon, and mapped the human genome--arose only once in human history, and that from within a Christian worldview. And this is not merely an historical oddity. Rather, Christian theism provides the logical grounding that makes science a worthwhile endeavor. Scientific naturalism does not. To be sure, today's well-trained (but poorly-educated) atheist scientist can engage in scientific research, but he cannot logically justify it. Among some two dozen assumptions that logically ground science (which come from Judeo-Christianity and for which atheism cannot account), two of the most important are that the physical universe is orderly and that our senses and reasoning are reliable in discerning that order. Christian men of the 16th and 17th centuries found in Scripture that the universe is the product of the mind of the caring, transcendent Creator, and so expected that the universe would be ordered, reflecting God's intelligence and rationality. Similarly, they discovered in the Bible that we humans are created in God's image, which they took to include sharing at least in part in His rationality.

The naturalist scientist depends upon there being order in the universe, but can only accept it as a fortunate brute fact--he cannot offer an explanation for it. As for the reliability of human senses and reasoning (in discerning that order), the situation is even worse. If--as on the evolutionary view--the human brain is simply the end-product of a designless, purposeless evolutionary process, there is no reason to expect its beliefs to be reliable in discerning reality. As astronomer and popular science writer Paul Davies has it,

People take it for granted that the physical world is both ordered and intelligible. The underlying order in nature--the laws of physics--are simply accepted as given, as brute facts. Nobody asks where they came from; at least not in polite company. However, even the most atheistic scientist accepts as an act of faith that the universe is not absurd, that there is a rational basis to physical existence manifested as law-like order in nature that is at least partly comprehensible to us. So science can proceed only if the scientist adopts an essentially theological worldview.

The early evolutionist J.B.S. Haldane also saw the problem:

If my mental processes are determined wholly by the motions of the atoms in my brain, I have no reason to suppose that my beliefs are true... and hence I have no reason for supposing my brain to be composed of atoms.

Philosopher Alvin Plantinga sums it up thus,

Modern science was conceived, and born, and flourished in the matrix of Christian theism. Only liberal doses of self-deception and double-think, I believe, will permit it to flourish in the context of Darwinian naturalism.

C.S. Lewis made the analogy to dreaming and waking. While awake, we can account for our dreaming, but while dreaming, we cannot fit in the waking world.

The waking world is judged more real because it can thus contain the dreaming world. The dreaming world is judged less real because it cannot contain the waking one. For the same reason I am certain that in passing from the scientific points of view to the theological, I have passed from dream to waking. Christian theology can fit in science, art, morality, and the sub-Christian religions. The scientific point of view [here he has specifically in mind the evolutionary-based naturalism of the past several decades] cannot fit in any of these things, not even science itself. I believe in Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen, not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else.

Why, as a scientist, do I believe in the God of Christianity? I have so far given only a very partial answer, but one I hope that addresses some of your most central issues. In part, I am a Christian because all of the scientific evidence (regarding the big-picture questions) falls squarely on the side of Christianity and is opposite the evidences required for the success of a naturalistic project. More basically, Christianity makes science a worthwhile endeavor, by providing the necessary logical grounding; naturalism can neither logically justify nor defend the scientific enterprise.*

My hope, E______, is that you are really open to the truth on this central question of human existence (otherwise I've wasted a good deal of my valuable time already). I realize that there is powerful motivation for seeking to deny the existence of God, since the idea of a transcendent, all-powerful, all-knowing, and holy God who might concern himself with our human affairs and behavior can be terrifying. But reality is impervious to our wishes, and so (at least for me) finding the truth trumps my desires.

If you are open to continued dialogue, I could share (in separate emails) any or all of the following:

How the scientific evidence supports the Christian worldview regarding the other big questions (that I alluded to earlier),

Why neo-Darwinian evolution is a dying theory that will no longer be defended by anyone once tenured dinosaurs like Richard Dawkins pass away, (how the fossil record, genetic evidence, etc. support the idea of creative interventions and refute evolutionary claims),

How Christianity grounds--and naturalism fails to logically justify--morality,

How archaeology vindicates the historical reliability of the Old and New Testaments,

How fulfilled prophecy points to the supernatural character of the Bible,

How the history of Western civilization and all of the available evidence powerfully support the historicity of the rising of Jesus of Nazareth from the grave,

etc.

Let me know...

Rick Gerhardt
Biologist and Christ-follower

* Two of the really ludicrous notions that in our day get much popular press out of the scientific community are 1) that scientists are the experts in defing science, and 2) that the definition of science involves an exclusive appeal to physical or natural laws and phenomenon. In truth, we scientists--unless we have embarked on intentional separate study--receive no education in the history and philosophy of science. It is, therefore, not scientists, but philosophers of science who are the experts in what science is. And philosophers of science are unanimous in declaring that no one has successfully defended the claim that science is restricted to material, physical, or natural explanations. To put it another way, to the extent that scientists artificially limit themselves to studying only natural phenomena, they have disqualified themselves from making any larger metaphysical claims (as about the non-existence of immaterial or supernatural things). So in yet another way, scientific naturalism can be seen as a grand effort in fallacious self-delusion.

God of the Gaps

[Besides entering my busiest time of year work-wise, I'm teaching one class at the Kilns and another two classes on the internet. What suffers is my time to write new blog posts. So the following is taken from a discussion thread in my internet class, in which I clarify what I take to be the issue with the God-of-the-gaps charge.]

I guess I have a slightly different take on the God-of-the-gaps issue. As I see it, this is not so much something of which Christians generally (and much less practicing scientists who are Christians) are really guilty. Rather, it is an illegitimate charge made against Christians by naturalists. And when naturalists raise this charge, they are generally guilty of several logical fallacies...

1) They are guilty of creating a straw man. While there may be some who easily claim "because God did it" too early in the search for explanations, this is an extreme position and not the one taken by the vast majority of Christians engaged in scientific discussion. When one addresses only the absurd, extreme articulations of his opponents (setting up a straw man that is easily knocked down) instead of addressing the thoughtful, difficult objections made by more moderate opponents, one is being academically disingenuous and logically fallacious.

2) They are guilty of the ad futurum fallacy. (I actually wanted to make up my own name for a fallacy, the "log-in-your-own-eye fallacy," but will stick with a well-recognized name.) But what I mean is that the naturalist is equally guilty (moreso, actually) of engaging in naturalism-of-the-gaps. The claim is that while we don't currently know the natural explanation, give us 75 years and we will. This is a faulty appeal to the future. In good reasoning, one is expected to find the best explanation for all the currently available evidence, rather than appeal to hypothetical future evidence.

3) More fundamentally, the naturalist is guilty of equivocation, wrongly using two significantly different definitions of the 'gaps' being addressed.

The naturalist likes to identify epistemological gaps (gaps of knowledge), and show that historically such gaps have closed. But the more interesting gaps--and those raised by the old-Earth creationist and the proponent of Intelligent Design--are ontological gaps (gaps of existence or being). The naturalist serves his own cause by conflating these two definitions or by ignoring this crucial distinction.

We could discuss (for example) the gap between the existence of a universe and the non-existence of a universe, or the gap between the Edicarean life forms and those of the Cambrian. These are fundamentally gaps of being, not merely gaps in our knowledge. And while the actual gaps involved are unchanging, the epistemological gaps (as we better understand the breadth and suddenness of the Cambrian explosion) are getting larger, not smaller. Perhaps the best example is that of the origin of life. The gap between non-living chemistry and the simplest life is now understood to be much larger than any evolutionary naturalist ever conceived.

So, it is rather uninteresting to note that we ought not be guilty of appealing to the supernatural prematurely, when there is still every indication that a natural (process) explanation will be found (for whatever phenomenon is being studied). But when we are studying origins* questions (rather than process questions), there is every reason to use abductive reasoning, and explanations that involve a supernatural being can reasonably be offered in such cases. This is especially true since only a theistic worldview logically grounds the assumptions that make science worthwhile (as discussed in another thread).



* Failure to differentiate between empirical (process) research and historical (origins) research also serves the scientific naturalist's cause. Whether this represents mere imprecision/naivete or disingenuity on their part I'm never quite sure.

A Particular Metaphysic

So far, I've posted three statements about anthropogenic global warming (AGW) about which I have a good deal of certainty. They were 1) Despite what much of the media say, there is a good deal of disagreement among scientists about the validity of claims about AGW, 2) The issue is primarily a political--not a scientific--debate, and 3) the Earth is remarkable in its ability to maintain life-friendly surface temperatures throughout life's history and despite huge changes in the amount of solar energy reaching it.

The next (and, I think, last) three statements I'll make on the subject are quite interrelated, so much so that it is difficult to decide which should come first. Here's what I came up with...

The anthropogenic global warming debate is being carried out almost entirely within a particular metaphysical perspective, that of naturalism.

Now, regular readers will realize that I frequently blog about the issue of scientific naturalism. I have argued that there is neither historical, philosophical, or practical justification for adopting a naturalistic approach to doing science, and I have shown that all of the latest important scientific discoveries have undermined a naturalistic understanding of the world in which we live and supported a theistic one. I have even argued that naturalism cannot logically ground either the scientific enterprise or the reliability of human reasoning.

My goal here is not to advance or defend those arguments again. Rather, it is simply to point out that in this important debate about anthropogenic global warming, its possible consequences and those of proposed solutions, we continue to act as though nature is the whole show despite overwhelming evidence and reason to the contrary.

Is this important? I suggest it is. If either AGW or its proposed solutions are as significant as people and the media seem to think, then it only makes sense that we begin our search for truth from within a metaphysically accurate worldview rather than from within a worldview that excludes the accurate answers. Let me illustrate this with just one practical example by referring back to yesterday's post.

The default position throughout the history of Western thought has been to acknowledge that things that appear to be designed--like the universe itself and living things and their components--are designed. It has only been very recently that scientists and others have kidded themselves into thinking that the design apparent in everything we see in the world around us is, in fact, only apparent. Let's see where these two very different approaches lead with regard to the thermal regulatory efficiency of the Earth and its atmosphere (discussed yesterday).

If the Earth's remarkable efficiency at maintaining life-friendly surface temperatures is designed (as the evidence would suggest), then we would do well to understand it better in order to work with that design to prevent future failure. If, on the other hand, we rule out design with regard to the atmosphere (and crust and plate tectonics and life and all the other interrelated factors mentioned yesterday), we are likely to miss important cues that would help to solve whatever real problems arise.

But what is actually going on is a worse option. And that is that the idea that the universe and life are designed has become so unpalatable to so many moderns--for reasons having to do with the theological and moral implications--that the features and efficiency of the Earth's thermoregulating mechanisms are not merely dismissed as only apparent but are in fact ignored altogether. I trust that you can understand that this is not the way to go about arriving at an accurate understanding of these important issues. Just as the relatively recent discoveries of the roles and purposes of the human tonsils and appendix required that researchers be open to their being designed (and eschewing the naturalistic conclusion that they were the useless byproducts of an evolutionary process), so, too, breakthrough discoveries about the threat of AGW likely require an openness to the design of the entire system, design attested to by all of the evidence available from life's long history on Earth.

Efficiently Regulated

Here's my third statement about global warming...

The Earth is truly remarkable in its ability to maintain life-friendly surface temperatures for billions of years despite drastic changes in the amount of solar energy reaching it. The mechanisms in place for this thermal regulation have always been (apparently) extremely efficient.

The complexity of the thermal regulation about which I'm talking is mind-boggling, so I'll try to keep it simple. During the tenure of life on Earth (some 3.86 billion years), the solar energy reaching Earth has increased by 30 percent. And yet, the Earth's surface temperatures have stayed within a very narrow life-friendly range.*

If you've read much about the global warming issue, you're undoubtedly familiar with some of the factors that go into determining the Earth's surface temperature. A short list includes the atmosphere and its make-up (amounts and proportions of greenhouse gasses and such), the amount of energy coming from the sun (natch), and the Earth's albedo (read 'reflectivity'). But besides the obvious factors that play into these things, a host of other factors have played a role in maintaining this delicate balance throughout life's history. These include the amounts and forms of life on Earth, the timing and extent of extinction events, the varying rate at which once-living material has been stored in the Earth's crust and mantle, the timing of the re-release of such carbon deposits to the atmosphere,** and more.

As scientists continue to research these things, more factors are added to this list. The point is that all of these very different things act--and always have acted--in concert to keep Earth at a life-supporting temperature even though the energy input has varied drastically through time.

Now it is possible that the humans alive today have the capacity to throw this efficient, time-tested thermal regulatory mechanism out of whack. It should be noted, however, that some historical occurrences would seem to have involved perturbations to this system that would have dwarfed--in terms of abruptness and magnitude--even the sum of current human perturbations. (As just one example, think of Chicxulub, the meteorite that wiped out the last of the dinosaurs when it struck the coast of the Yucatan, sending debris 3000 miles in every direction and blotting out the sun for two years or more.) It is also noteworthy that every once in awhile (though with seemingly less fanfare than the dire predictions receive), a scientist will go on record as being amazed by the unexpected resiliency of the atmosphere (explaining, in part, why the predictions made by the models have failed to actualize).

Again, what I have shared in this latest certain and confident statement does not prove that anthropogenic global warming is false, nor does it mean that it's true. It seems, however, that it should play a part in the search for the truth on this issue, but it just doesn't seem to come up much; perhaps it's another of those 'inconvenient truths.'



* There have been periods--though not while humans were alive--when the Earth was quite a bit warmer than today, but no so warm as to preclude the flourishing of living things.

** You'll notice that these last two factors have to do with plate tectonics and the resulting earthquakes and volcanoes. This is yet another aspect of the Earth that is necessary for life's existence, and one that is believed to be unique to Earth (among other identified planets both in our solar system and outside it).

Lucretius and Naturalism

Did I mention that I'm in a class on the History and Philosophy of Atheism (at Kilns College)? Well, I am, and today I want to post about the first reading. Our text for the course is The Portable Atheist: Essential Readings for the Nonbeliever. These essential readings are selected and introduced by New Atheist Christopher Hitchens, and promise to provide good fodder for any Christian apologist-blogger. In today's post, I'll identify two sets of problems, one in the reading (by Lucretius) and one in Hitchens' introduction to it.

Lucretius was an ancient Greek naturalist; he lived in the early 1st century BC and (following Leucippus) promoted atomism, the view that in our day would be called naturalism. He rejected the pantheism of the Greek and Roman worlds of his day, pointing out that what those pagans credited to the acts of the gods could be better explained as the result of natural laws.

I find Hitchens' inclusion of Lucretius' De Rerum Natura intriguing for at least three reasons.

First, the entire project of the ancient atomists depended upon our universe being infinite as regards both space and time, a claim that Lucretius is at pains to make (though not to support). This idea was likewise foundational to Darwin's 19th-century theory and remains (logically) foundational to modern atheism. Unfortunately--for Hitchens and his ilk (Richard Dawkins admits that his opponents have accused him of being stuck in 19th-century science and further admits that he doesn't know what they're talking about)--20th century science has convincingly refuted this foundational assumption. For most scientists, philosophers of science, and historians of science, the greatest discovery of the last 100 years was the recognition that all of the matter, energy, space, and time of the universe had a beginning a finite time ago. The universe began--it is finite with regard to both space and time. Lucretius and Epicurus were wrong on this basic score, as were Kant and Darwin. I am left wondering whether Hitchens and Dawkins fail to realize the implications (for metaphysical naturalism) or are simply in denial of the evidence.

Second, Lucretius also makes clear that living things reproduce after their kind, that there is a continuity of reproduction. This idea--known to the ancient Greeks--passed out of knowledge in the Western world, and throughout the Middle Ages, educated people believed (what Homer, writing in the 8th century BC, knew to be false) that life was spontaneously generated (as maggots from rotten meat). Some would argue that modern biology began when Francesco Redi disproved spontaneous generation (at least with regard to worms in meat). Geneticist Giuseppi Sermonti, discussing the later refutation of spontaneous generation by Pasteur (with regard to bacteria), writes

Biology has advanced in status with every new refutation of the spontaneous generation thesis.

And yet, modern disciples of Darwin (like Hitchens and Dawkins) continue--contrary to all the evidence and reason--to steadfastly maintain the spontaneous generation of life from non-life.

The third problem has to do with the history of science, and seems to betray a further weakness in Hitchens' understanding. I take it that Hitchens approves of Lucretius' essay as an ancient articulation of the superiority of a reasoned appeal to natural law over a superstitious appeal to acts of the gods. But while Lucretius was right in this particular, this stands as an argument against polytheism and pantheism, but not against Christian monotheism. That is, if Hitchens' book is meant to be an argument for atheism as over against Christianity, then De Rerum Natura misses the point. More importantly, however, it was Christians--not atheists--who agreed with Lucretius, saw the world as following natural laws, and thus established (in the 16th and 17th centuries) modern science.

As glaring as are these problems in De Rerum Natura itself, there's an arguably bigger problem with Hitchens' introduction to it. Having established that Lucretius' atomism was a superior, more reasoned understanding of the world (than the religious superstitions of that day), he writes,

Atomism was viciously persecuted as heresy throughout the early Christian era, and only one printed manuscript of De Rerum Naturum survived the flames.

What is one to make of such a statement? Is it revisionist history foisted on us by someone for whom the ends (turning readers into unbelievers) justifies the means (making up history)? To be sure, atomism didn't carry the day, and the Greeks and Romans continued to worship their pantheons of gods. But there was no persecution of the ancient Greek naturalists. (Lucretius may have committed suicide, but if so it appears to be a direct consequence of his disbelief in an afterlife, and not because of any contemporary reaction against his views.) There is no evidence that atomist books were burned; the reason such books did not survive is because they were written on papyrus or animal skins, and the same fate faced every ancient writing regardless of its metaphysical claims.

But more importantly, why does Hitchens refer to the 'early Christian era' if not to wrongfully impugn Christians? Throughout the early Christian era, Christians were too busy being persecuted themselves to persecute others. They were themselves being burned at the stake and not burning obscure books about natural philosophy. Even when--much later in church history--Christians did turn their attention to the subjects of orthodoxy and heresy, the issues that captured their attention for several centuries had to do with the nature of the trinity and the deity/humanity of Christ, not what a minor sector of dead Greek poets had written.

Coming as it does in the introduction to the very first selection in his book, this statement by Hitchens raises a bright red flag. At best, it highlights either gross ignorance about or willing gullibility regarding the issues about which he writes. At worst, it stamps him at the outset as disingenuous or downright deceiving and his book as a skewed polemic rather than an honest search for truth.

Making Sense of the World

In my last series of posts (on the faulty analogy central to the arguments of New Atheists Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens), I mentioned in passing that atheism (in the form of scientific naturalism) does not provide a logical justification for doing science, whereas Christian theism does. I want in this post to flesh that out just a bit.

The fact of the matter is that modern science arose and flourished within a Christian understanding of the world. And this was not mere historical coincidence but precisely because Judeo-Christianity uniquely provides the set of assumptions that make science a worthwhile endeavor.

A short list of such assumptions includes... the existence of the universe, the order in the universe, the fact that the laws of mathematics apply to the universe, the fact that the laws of logic apply to the universe, the reliability of our senses in discovering the order in the universe, the reliability of human reasoning in drawing accurate conclusions about the universe, the necessity of honesty and integrity in conducting and reporting research...

Science depends upon these assumptions, and Christianity has a reasonable explanation for each and every one. Naturalism, not so much. In the case of most of these assumptions, scientific naturalism does not deny them, but accepts them as unexplained, unexplainable, brute (and fortuitous) facts. For others, naturalism would seem to fare even more poorly. As just one example, if naturalistic evolution is true, and human consciousness and reason are merely the purposeless results of undirected interactions of biochemicals, there seems no reason to accept that human reasoning should lead to meaningful and accurate conclusions about the world.

This problem has been recognized in recent years by a variety of thinkers from across the theological spectrum. Agnostic physicist Paul Davies, for example, wrote

People take it for granted that the physical world is both ordered and intelligible. The underlying order in nature—the laws of physics—are simply accepted as given, as brute facts. Nobody asks where they came from; at least not in polite company. However, even the most atheistic scientist accepts as an act of faith that the universe is not absurd, that there is a rational basis to physical existence manifested as law-like order in nature that is at least partly comprehensible to us. So science can proceed only if the scientist adopts an essentially theological worldview.

Christian philosopher Alvin Plantinga puts it this way:

Modern science was conceived, and born, and flourished in the matrix of Christian theism. Only liberal doses of self-deception and double-think, I believe, will permit it to flourish in the context of Darwinian naturalism.

Some of my readers will be familiar with a famous sentence of C.S. Lewis':

I believe in Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen, not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else.

What some may not realize, however, is the context of this quote. It is the final statement of a paper titled "Is theology poetry?" (which can be found in the compilation of essays The Weight of Glory). And what Lewis is dealing with is exactly what I've been writing about, how scientific naturalism (what Lewis calls the "mythical cosmology derived from science") cannot explain things nearly so well as Christian theism can. So, although it's lengthy, here's the final paragraph of Lewis' argument:

I was taught at school, when I had done a sum, to "prove my answer." The proof or verification of my Christian answer to the cosmic sum is this. When I accept Theology I may find difficulties, at this point or that, in harmonising it with some particular truths which are imbedded in the mythical cosmology derived from science. But I can get in, or allow for, science as a whole. Granted that Reason is prior to matter and that the light of that primal Reason illuminates finite minds, I can understand how men should come, by observation and inference, to know a lot about the universe they live in. If, on the other hand, I swallow the scientific cosmology as a whole, then not only can I not fit in Christianity, but I cannot even fit in science. If minds are wholly dependent on brains, and brains on biochemistry, and biochemistry (in the long run) on the meaningless flux of the atoms, I cannot understand how the thought of those minds should have any more significance than the sound of the wind in the trees. And this is to me the final test. This is how I distinguish dreaming and waking. When I am awake I can, in some degree, account for and study my dream. The dragon that pursued me last night can be fitted into my waking world. I know that there are such things as dreams; I know that I had eaten an indigestible dinner; I know that a man of my reading might be expected to dream of dragons. But while in the nightmare I could not have fitted in my waking experience. The waking world is judged more real because it can thus contain the dreaming world; the dreaming world is judged less real because it cannot contain the waking one. For the same reason I am certain that in passing from the scientific points of view to the theological, I have passed from dream to waking. Christian theology can fit in science, art, morality, and the sub-Christian religions. The scientific point of view cannot fit in any of these things, not even science itself. I believe in Christianity as I believe that the sun has risen, not only because I see it, but because by it I see everything else.

Motivation in Science Teaching

I'm finally getting around to reading Dinesh D'Souza's What's So Great About Christianity, and it's the sort of book I love. It has, of course, a strong apologetic component, and mixes in a good deal of history. I also appreciate D'Souza's wit and logic.

In chapter 4, he discusses the atheist agenda to indoctrinate our children with anti-religion, which begins in the science classroom. D'Souza quotes an editorial in The Economist,

Darwinism has enemies mostly because it is not compatible with a literal interpretation of Genesis.

D'Souza goes on to make the point that Darwinism has friends and supporters for exactly the same reason. Indeed, the whole reason for teaching Darwinism is in order to marginalize theism, and especially Christianity. (Go here to see how impractical and unnecessary is an understanding of evolutionary theory to actual scientific, medical, or pharmaceutical advance.) According to D'Souza, it might seem possible that

the Darwinists are merely standing up for science. But surveys show that the vast majority of young people in America today are scientifically illiterate, widely ignorant of all aspects of science. How many high school graduates could tell you the meaning of Einstein's famous equation? Lots of young people don't have a clue about photosynthesis or Boyle's Law. So why isn't there a political movement to fight for the teaching of photosynthesis? Why isn't the ACLU filing lawsuits on behalf of Boyle's Law?

He continues,

The answer is clear. For the defenders of Darwinism, no less than for its critics, religion is the issue. Just as some people oppose the theory of evolution because they believe it to be anti-religious, many others support it for the very same reason. That is why we have Darwinism but not Keplerism; we encounter Darwinists but no one describes himself as an Einsteinian. Darwinism has become an ideology.

Regaining Consciousness

Steven asks,

So how does an unconcious human being regain consciousness? Does God work a miracle every time somebody comes out of the operating room? Does God have to remember not to restore consciousness until the anaesthetic wears off, or else people will be able to see a miracle?

I suspect that Steven thinks he's either being clever here, or else coming up with penetrating and difficult questions that somehow jeopardize Moreland's conclusion (see preceding posts) that the origin of consciousness is better explained by Christian theism than by naturalism.

As an aside, it continues to amaze me how often it is the defender of theism who wants to deal with reason and evidence and the person taking the side of materialistic science who tries to bring in theological considerations. The answers to Steven's questions here depend upon one's definition of miracle as well as one's understanding of the degree of God's sovereignty. And these are issues upon which even Christians come to different conclusions.

But none of these questions address the real issue (yes, these too are red herrings), which was the origin of consciousness. In fact, the subject of regaining consciousness further highlights the problems with a materialist view of personhood (and the superiority of the Christian view). Let me offer (in support of this claim) three lines of argument, two evidential and one logical.

There is a vast and growing body of data that clearly demonstrates that the person/mind exists independent of the human body. That is, in cases of lost consciousness or (especially) near-death experiences, the human mind can relate verifiable events from elsewhere that occurred while the unconscious or lifeless body remained in one place. (The best source I know for this sort of evidence is Beyond Death by Gary Habermas and J.P. Moreland.)

Another field of research that leads to the same conclusion (that mind/consciousness is independent of or separate from brain) is neurosurgery, specifically brain probing done with a conscious patient. In such cases, the surgeon can cause the patient's toe (say) to move by innervating a particular portion of the brain. The patient will frequently say (in effect), "You did that--it wasn't me." These sorts of results have led many of the leading neurophysiologists to abandon the naturalistic views with which they began and to accept that we are more than just physical beings, that we have a mind/soul/spirit.

Of course, philosophers have been skeptical of the materialist view since long before that skepticism was verified by empirical proofs. Simply put, consciousness and related things (thoughts, memories, desires, emotions) are categorically different than physical things like gray matter, neurons, brain cells. That is, we can--in discussing the latter--refer to their mass, or color, or electrical charge. But such physical characteristics are absurd for describing memories or consciousness.

This is not to say, of course, that our brains (and eyes and ears) have no role to play (at least at present) in our ability to access memories or to articulate sights and sounds. But the fact is (as science is increasingly demonstrating), persons (that is, conscious minds) can see real events while those persons are no longer associated with their bodies. The strangest examples include blind people, some of whose 'minds' acurately desribe events that their sightless eyes would have prevented them from accessing had they still been in their bodies.

The point is, human consciousness exists apart from the human body, a scientific finding that is fatal to a materialist understanding of the world. Steven's facetious attempt at raising the issue of 'lost consciousness' strengthens the theistic view espoused by Moreland in his new book (and weakens the materialist view Steven seems to want to defend).

Science's Blind Spot

Last week, I read (for the first time) Science's Blind Spot by Cornelius G. Hunter. Subtitled The Unseen Religion of Scientific Naturalism, this book is a must for anyone interested in the debate about what science is or in the history of modern science.

Most of us know that some of today's biologists (especially) and other scientists are outspoken atheists, and it is easy to assume that atheism itself is at the heart of today's naturalism in science. But according to science historian Hunter, these atheists are Johhny-come-latelys; it was not scientific evidence but theological considerations that led scientists of the 17th through 19th centuries to restrict themselves to naturalistic explanations of the workings of the universe. Here's a sample...

What we need, to begin with, is a clear understanding of what naturalism is. Naturalism's adherents think it is a scientific discovery, and its detractors think it is atheism in disguise. In fact, it is a rationalist movement built on a foundation of religious thought and traditions that mandate a world that operates according to natural laws and processes. In this theological naturalism, religious justifications are freely used, but all explanations must be naturalistic. There are problems with many naturalistic explanations, but this is not why naturalism is ailing. It is ailing because it cannot contemplate the possibility that it might be wrong. It cannot evaluate these problems from a larger perspective...

This restriction of explanation leads to an unavoidable blind spot. Theological naturalism is ailing because it has no choice but to pursue all problems as equals... Theological naturalism lacks the resources to look at all sides of a problem. It lacks the wisdom to know its own limitations.

Science and Naturalism

Several weeks ago, I delivered a talk at a luncheon of the Bend (OR) Apologetics Guild. It was titled "Science and Naturalism." Both the powerpoint presentation and the audio of that talk are now available on line (albeit in two different places). For the audio, go here, and to see the powerpoint, go here.

Science and Naturalism

I opened this year's (Bend, OR) Apologetics Guild luncheon series today with a talk on "Science and Naturalism." We discovered that there is no historical, philosophical, or scientific justification for bringing a naturalistic worldview or approach to science. Indeed, we saw that, as Alvin Plantinga asserts,

Modern science was conceived, and born, and flourished in the matrix of Christian theism. Only liberal doses of self-deception and double-think, I believe, will permit it to flourish in the context of Darwinian naturalism.

I hope to make both the PowerPoint and the audio portion of my talk available for download and listening, and will let my readers know when those are available.

There is one thing, which bears upon this question, that I didn't have time to share. I'll do that now (for those of you who heard my talk, consider this bonus coverage).

I cannot think of a single scientific discipline--except for evolution itself--in which understanding biological evolutionary theory (macroevolution) has any practical value for conducting research. One can be a top-notch chemist, physicist, geologist, astronomer, ecologist, conservation biologist, biochemist, medical researcher, or what have you, and never let biological evolutionary theory cross one's mind. Likewise, the research carried out in any and all of these disciplines contributes nothing to understanding or advancing evolutionary theory.

Richard Dawkins is so enamored with evolution that he believes that if superintelligent beings from elsewhere in the universe ever make contact with us, the first question they will ask is "Have you discovered evolution yet?"

But if biological evolution is of such central importance to science--if, indeed, it is the imagined success of evolutionary theory that has caused us to unwisely accept a naturalistic approach to science generally--then why can research in all of the other scientific disciplines be conducted without any reference to it?

Lactose Tolerance

I want to interact with another science article from a recent New York Times. Titled "Spread Globally, Evolved Locally," this piece (by Nicholas Wade) discusses some truly exciting research from the field of human genomics. Researchers have identified parts of the genome where differences exist among human populations and discovered that such differences include adaptations for lactose tolerance, malaria resistance, and salt retention (to name a few).

I want to focus on the lactose tolerance. But first, a couple of general comments. While the article is liberal with the use of the word 'evolution,' let's start by acknowledging that it's talking only about 'microevolution,' the changes that occur over time within a species. We might further emphasize that we're discussing a species that originated only tens of thousands of years ago. The article itself recognizes that

The ancestral human population is thought to have originated in northeast Africa about 50,000 years ago.

All of this is consistent, of course, not only with a theistic understanding but also a specifically biblical one. I could, therefore, quibble with the use of the term 'evolution' (with all that it is meant to connote), when 'microevolution' or (better yet) 'adaptation' would have more accurately described the research findings.

My real issue with the interpretation of these research results, though, is two-fold: the unsupported inference that natural selection is the driving force and the assumption that the genetic differences involve random mutations. These two ideas form, of course, the standard neo-Darwinian dogma, but the evidence of these studies--if considered objectively--would seem to suggest design or purpose rather than the randomness and chance associated with naturalism.

According to the article, lactose tolerance arose in (at least) four different human populations in four different parts of the genome. So far, so good. Identifying the genome differences and accurately describing the adaptation with which those differences are associated--that's great science. But it is really naive to expect us to believe that those genomic differences are the result of random mutations. For one thing, we now have an idea of how truly rare are instances of beneficial mutations compared to fatal or harmful (those that lead to natural abortion, death, or reproductive unfitness of the individual), or neutral mutations. We can also demonstrate that humans (like all other higher animals) are not good candidates for mutational advance on the basis of demographic parameters--few offspring, long inter-generational times, low population numbers (again, to name but a few). Moreover, other geneticists would be quick to suggest that the differences herein identified likely represent not so much a new gene, but a differential activation (by a sort of 'controller gene'), a turning off (or on), an effecting of a potential that was already (always?) in the genome.

On this (more objective) view, this latest research offers evidence against the random mutation idea and for the notion that the human genome exhibits even greater design--call it 'inherent potential' if your worldview can't accept the idea of design (and then make a note to upgrade your worldview before too long)--than was previously recognized.

But this research would seem to undermine not only the idea that the mutations are random but also the other half of the evolutionary paradigm--that natural selection is the driving force. On the dogmatic view of the author (and, apparently, the researchers themselves), natural selection is not only a very powerful force but the only mechanism that need be invoked (that, after all, is still the textbook explanation). In the case of the origin of lactose tolerance, does this really make good sense?

Picture a population of northern European cattle-herders 5,000 years ago (when this adaptation is seen to have arisen). One herder develops a gene mutation that enables him to drink the milk from his herd without a rash or other negative side effects. On the naturalistic evolution view, this adaptation is so significant that his ability to survive and reproduce so exceeds that of others of his generation and clan that his progeny soon outnumber theirs by 10 to 1. (On the traditional view, a mutation arises in one individual and is dependent on reproduction to spread through a population generation by generation. On the more recent view--that the capacity for this genetic change was inherent in the genome, and 'switched on'--the right conditions could cause many individuals in the same generation to have this same adaptation.) We are meant to believe that those who still could not drink milk (without developing a rash on the inside of their elbows) died before having children, while this one adaptation endowed the milk drinker with overwhelming survivorship and productivity. In other words, environmental factors somehow dictated that the ability to process milk efficiently was the make-or-break characteristic for this population of humans (though they had been surviving and reproducing up until that point).

But we must not stop at believing that this was the case for northern Europeans. The research shows that three other human populations experienced similar environmental conditions in which a gene change (albeit a different gene in each case) that conferred tolerance for lactose was likewise the make-or-break characteristic. According to the article...

That lactose tolerance has evolved independently four times is an instance of convergent evolution. Natural selection has used the different mutations available in European and East African populations to make each develop lactose tolerance.

Authors (and researchers) who cavalierly mention convergent evolution seem to be unaware that the discovery of more and more "instances" of it argues against the naturalistic paradigm. If there is no purpose or design associated with these changes within a population, then it should be rare indeed that environmental conditions "select" for a similar adaptation in different populations.

Here's the bottom line... These exciting research discoveries--when viewed objectively--support a theistic or design understanding of the documented adaptive changes within recent human populations and undermine the 'natural selection acting upon random mutation' paradigm. That the author and researchers are unable to recognize this is a testimony to their lack of objectivity and of the extent to which they have chosen to work within the artificial constraints of naturalism. While some marvelous research is taking place, their naturalistic misinterpretation of the results stifles the scientific advance toward truth to which such research might otherwise lead.

An Immaterial Soul

So, I want to return to the article I was discussing a couple of posts ago, "Science of the Soul?" I have argued that the naturalism with which it begins and ends represents a faulty, artificially-constrained approach to science that actually limits our ability to discover truth about the world in which we live. Now, I want to get a bit more specifically critical, to show that this particular article is grossly imbalanced in its treatment of this controversial subject.

The conclusion of this article is the party line among naturalists, that mind and consciousness are merely emergent properties that have evolved in higher animals, including humans. This is meant to convince us that physicalism is true, and that there are no immaterial aspects to reality (God, angels, souls). And this, of course, would have to be true if naturalism is true. We've already discussed the circular nature of this sort of argument. But this article also comes nowhere near giving an accurate depiction of the state of research in this area of science.

Once Darwinism gained wide acceptance (despite the abundant evidence that continues to present huge problems for it), researchers in nearly all fields of science (and history, economics, sociology, and other disciplines) began to adopt a naturalistic approach. Thus, neurobiologists and brain physiologists (for the past many years) have begun with a working belief in naturalism and physicalism (and a denial of any immaterial component). But the evidence has inexorably caused objective researchers to come to the opposite conclusion.

A case in point is Wilder Penfield, considered the father of neurosurgery.

Through my own scientific career, I, like other scientists, have struggled to prove that the brain accounts for the mind.

In the end, the evidence (primarily from brain stimulation experiments) caused Penfield to give up the struggle:

To expect the highest brain mechanism or any set of reflexes, however complicated, to carry out what the mind does, and thus perform all the functions of the mind, is quite absurd. What a thrill it is, then, to discover that the scientist, too, can legitimately believe in the existence of the spirit.

Likewise, Sir Charles Sherrington, Oxford physiology professor and Nobel Prize winner, after a career of pioneering research in the workings of the brain and spinal cord, said (five days before he died)...

For me now, the only reality is the human soul.

Even affirmed naturalists acknowledge that the physicalist position is unsupported:

We don't have an adequate theory of how the brain causes conscious states, and we don't have an adequate theory of how consciousness fits into the universe.

Another area of research that has caused scientists to abandon the physicalist view is the study of near-death experiences and the continuance of consciousness after death. Sam Parnia, a physician conducting such research says that it

would support the view that mind, 'consciousness,' or the 'soul' is a separate entity from the brain.

Anthropologist Marilyn Schlitz makes a similar summary of the evidence...

I would take the position of a radical empiricist, in that I am driven by data, not theory. And the data I see tell me that there are ways in which people's experience refutes the physicalist position that the mind is the brain and nothing more. There are solid, concrete data that suggest that our consciousness, our mind, may surpass the boundaries of the brain.

In light of this glimpse of the actual situation in this field of scientific research, the New York Times article can be seen (at best) as a very poorly-balanced piece of jounalism. At worst, it represents a mere insistence that physicalism must be true (because 'I don't want to make room for God in my worldview'), with no more convincing evidence and argumentation than that of the child who screws up his face and balls his fists and repeats unendingly "but I want that one!"

(Most of what I've shared in this post--including all of the quotes--can be found in chapter 10, "The Evidence of Consciousness" in Lee Strobel's The Case for a Creator. I also recommend Beyond Death by Gary Habermas and J.P. Moreland.)

Is Science Naturalistic?

The quote I shared yesterday (which came from a New York Times article about scientific findings with regard to the human soul) articulates a view found commonly in our day and culture...

There is no credible scientific challenge to the theory of evolution as an explanation for the diversity and complexity of life on Earth.

The fact is that there are indeed credible challenges, but that by redefining science as naturalistic we can dismiss such challenges as "unscientific." So the question before us today is, "Is there justification--historical, philosophical, or scientific--for allowing as science only naturalistic theories?"

Is there historical justification for equating science with a naturalistic worldview? Clearly, the answer is no. Modern science was founded by men and women who shared a monotheistic worldview. While other, more ancient civilizations made scientific advance (as in astronomy, navigation, and paper-making), science was 'stillborn' in those civilizations because their worldviews did not adequately provide justification for scientific pursuit. That rational justification came uniquely from the Judeo-Christian worldview of mid-second-millenium Europe. Indeed, for most of the time during which modern science has flourished, a supernatural (rather than natural) understanding of reality held sway among scientists. There is no historical justification for seeing science as naturalistic.

Is there philosophical justification for defining science in naturalistic terms? Again, the answer is clearly no. The question "What is science?" is best answered not by scientists themselves, most of whom have had little or no training in the philosophical basis for their pursuit. The experts on this question are philosophers of science. And they are unanimous in recognizing that there is no clear line of demarcation between science and non-science. Specifically, whether a theory is naturalistic or (conversely) involves an appeal to an intelligent designer does not mean that one is less scientific than the other. Naturalism is not a necessary criterion for adjudging a theory scientific, nor is appeal to the supernatural a sufficient criterion for rejecting a theory as unscientific.

Moreover, the historical case discussed above provides further insight into this question of philosophical justification. The same philosophical presuppositions that made modern science feasible--those that were uniquely present in the Judeo-Christian worldview and absent from that of other civilizations--are likewise absent from the naturalistic worldview. Let's consider just two. Christians have reason to expect (and a good explanation for) order, pattern, regularity, and purpose in the universe. They see these things as a natural (i.e., logical) expression of the transcendent Creator, who is Himself a rational, personal Being. On the naturalistic worldview, order and the fixity of natural laws are unexplained, brute facts, and it is taboo to even discuss the concept of 'purpose.' On the Judeo-Christian view, humans can discover the order in the universe because we are made in the image of God and thus likewise rational beings. Moreover, in His revelation to us (the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments), the Creator commands us to study the universe around us. But on the naturalistic worldview, there is no rational justification for believing that our reasoning or our senses are reliable for discovering truths about the most distant galaxies or the innermost workings of the cell. If our senses and brains are merely the result of a purposeless process whose selective mechanism worked only toward our survival to reproduce, then the ability to ask and answer esoteric scientific questions would seem to be outside the purview of evolution. Doing science still makes sense only within a Judeo-Christian worldview, whereas a naturalistic view provides no ultimate rational foundation for scientific endeavor.

If there's no historical and no philosophical basis for defining science naturalistically, is there a scientific justification for doing so? Is a naturalistic approach to science so successful that it merits acceptance as the best approach? Obviously not. We have already seen that the only reason a naturalistic explanation for the diversity of life (neo-Darwinian evolution) remains the dominant view is that its proponents have successfully (in school boards, courts, and media) excluded competing theories from the arena by wrongly appealing to naturalism as a necessary criterion for science. But the point I want to make here is that the diversity of life is only one of the many big questions about the reality of our universe that science ought to attempt to explain. Others include 'Why is there a universe?', 'Why is there order in the universe?', Why does the universe, our galaxy and solar system, our Earth exhibit the extremely fine-tuned characteristics necessary for life?', 'How did life come to be in the first place?', and 'How did consciousness arise?' Naturalism provides no reasonable explanation for any of these questions, while scientists operating from within a Judeo-Christian worldview do.

Indeed (to look at just one of these questions more closely), the latest science with regard to the origin of the universe undermines the naturalistic view in (at least) two ways. Not only does naturalistic science offer no reasonable explanation for the origin of the universe*, but the finding that the universe had a begining a finite time ago is at odds with a basic premise of Darwin's theory (the premise that the universe itself is eternal, that natural selection had a near-infinite amount of time with which to work).

Throughout most of western history, it has been perceived as irrational to adopt a naturalistic view of reality. Only with the acceptance of Darwin's theory for the diversity of life has naturalism attained even a modicum of reasonableness. And yet, there is a great deal of evidence that can be (or could be were it not artificially ruled out as 'unscientific') brought to bear against naturalistic evolution as a satsifactory explanation even for the single question it addresses--the diversity of life. More importantly, a theistic understanding provides a far better explanation (than a naturalistic one) for all of the other big questions about which science is interested.

It is high time that science was ransomed from the religious worldview--naturalism--that has commandeered it in our generation, and freed to once again be what it originally was--a search for truth about the way things are. Naturalism does nothing but artificially constrain the range of possible explanations, preventing us from discovering truth.

There simply is no justification for adopting a naturalistic approach to science, much less for insisting that all scientists adopt such an approach.




* Most naturalists end by appealing to the idea that ours is one of an infinte number of universes, and just happens to be the one that exhibits the parameters conducive to life. This view faces huge philosophical and scientific problems. Logically, such a view merely pushes back the problem of first cause, and most philosophers recognize the need for a self-existent Being behind either the universe we see or the multiverse we can only speculate. Of equal importance, appeal to an infinite number of universes concedes that on this most important question ('Why is there a universe?') science is impotent. Were there any other universes, we could never find the least bit of evidence for the existence of any of them, according to a simple (and long-known) mathematical theorem (proof).

The Circularity of Naturalism

Readers of Sunday's Bend (OR) Bulletin's science section were treated to no less than seven articles describing new research and assuring us that evolutionary biologists have proven that there is no God. Much of the actual research shared in these articles was fascinating, and much of it has real potential for advancing our understanding of the ways things are. Unfortunately, in each case, the authors of the articles and the researchers themselves begin with the uncritical ("faith-based," if I may borrow a term for my own use) acceptance of naturalism and common ancestry (macroevolution). Not only is the real value of the studies lost in a metaphysical mantra ("Evolution is the only God, and Natural Selection is his greatest Prophet"), but the entire project is an exercise in circular reasoning.

Let me give you an example. One of the articles (by Cornelia Dean of the New York Times News Service) is titled "Science of the Soul?" Its thesis can be found in this quote,

The idea that human minds are the product of evolution is "unassailable fact," the journal Nature said... on new findings on the physical basis of moral thought.

(As an aside, I was startled to learn that the journal Nature had evolved to the point of saying things itself; I suspect that the reality is that some individual--an intelligence--actually said these things in the journal Nature, but that citing this nameless someone would not have given us the same sense of authority and credibility as does crediting the journal itself.)

The actual evidence offered to support this bold thesis statement falls far short of doing so. It consists of two sets of observations. One is that feelings (including those from which moral senses seem to arise--empathy, disgust, joy) have a physical component in the brain. The other set of observations is that these sensations and their physical component are not unique to humans but seen also in higher animals, birds and mammals.

This entire article is a thinly-veiled attempt to address the problematic (that is, to naturalistic evolutionists) argument for the existence of God known as the "Moral Argument." The latter says that the only reasonable explanation for the universal moral intuition unique to humans is that there is an ultimate Lawgiver (the Christian version going on to make explicit that humans are uniquely "created in His image"). But theists have always been willing to grant both that higher animals have soulishness--share with us such things as mind, will, and emotion--and that there is a physical basis for these things.

The Christian view is that we are souls who have bodies, and further, that there is an immaterial (spiritual) component to our souls (which likely is not an aspect of the souls of higher animals). The view of naturalistic evolutionists is that all is physical and that there are no immaterial components to reality (whether souls or minds or God or angels). The problem is that this article provides no evidence that would distinguish between these two views, but then adds a great deal of absurd rhetoric claiming a scientific success on behalf of their view.

As is the case with each of the evolutionary articles in Sunday's paper, this one suffers from the fallacy of special pleading, in which only selective evidence is given and contrary evidence suppressed. In another post, I'll share some of the research that has led formerly naturalistic scientists in this very field (brain physiology) to abandon their naturalism and acknowledge the existence of an immaterial soul.

But the point of this post is to demonstrate that evolutionists are so trapped in their faith that they cannot recognize either the limits of their evidences (dealt with above) or the fallacious, circular nature of their reasoning processes. As to the latter, here's another quote from the article:

There is no credible scientific challenge to the theory of evolution as an explanation for the diversity and complexity of life on Earth.

The problem here is that the author wrongly confuses science (the supposedly objective discipline) with naturalism (the metaphysical or religious philosophy). The statement would be perfectly true if the author redressed this error, and replaced the word 'scientific' with the word 'naturalistic':

There is no credible naturalistic challenge to the theory of evolution as an explanation for the diversity and complexity of life on Earth.

There are (and always have been) credible scientific challenges to the theory of evolution. But they are inadmissable if we first redefine science to be naturalistic. In tomorrow's post, I'll (once again) show that there is neither an historical, a philosophical, nor a scientific justification for so redefining science. But for now, let me reiterate: to declare in advance that naturalism (physicalism) accurately describes reality, then to offer only naturalistic interpretations of your research, and finally to conclude that you have bolstered the proofs for a naturalistic theory, is nothing more than a self-deluding exercise in circular reasoning.

So watch for it--circular reasoning by evolutionists--coming soon to a newspaper, classroom, or television near you.

More Dawkins Fallacies

I can't remember another author, attempting to write persuasive argument, who crams more muddled thinking--a greater number of logical fallacies--into a single page or chapter than Richard Dawkins does in The God Delusion. A quote I included in my last post gives me opportunity to discuss (at least) two logical fallacies. Here's the quote...

All [the Gospels] have the status of legends, as factually dubious as the stories of King Arthur and his Knights of the Round Table.

The first fallacy here is what's known as circular reasoning (also called 'begging the question'). This occurs whenever the conclusion of an argument is contained in one of the premises. An example would be

'The Bible is the Word of God.'
'How do you know that?'
'Well, the Bible says it is.'
'But why should I believe what the Bible says?'
'Because it's the Word of God.'

This is obviously a circular argument. But that is just what Dawkins is doing. His premise is that the historical accounts about the events of Jesus' life are mere legends. Why? Because they include miracles and claims to being a divine Being, and these things don't have a place in Dawkins' naturalistic worldview. But proving that naturalistic worldview is the point of arguing that Jesus isn't really God in the first place! In the form of a syllogism, it looks like this:

Premise 1: Miracles don't occur, and God does not exist, because we live in a world in which naturalism accurately describes reality.
Premise 2: The Gospels claim for Jesus the title of God, and credit him with miracles.
Conclusion: The Gospels must, therefore, be legend, and so provide no evidence contrary to naturalism.

It's nothing but a circular argument, and thus fallacious and a waste of ink. But in addition, it commits the fallacy of the Faulty Analogy. An analogy is faulty when the superficial similarities between the two things being compared are less important than their critical and relevant differences. And such is the case here.

Dawkins' claim is that the Gospels and the Arthurian tales share the characteristic of being legend. This, of course, is mere opinion--Dawkins doesn't attempt to support it and, as we saw in my last post, others who are better qualified to judge come to an opposite conclusion. But a more obvious problem is that there are glaring, significant differences that make this analogy break down.

For starters, the Arthurian tales make no claims to being actual history; rather, they are given to us as legends. By contrast, the Gospels present themselves as accurate accounts of events that actually took place in the space/time of this universe (see, e.g., Luke 1:1-4 and John 20:30-31).

A second significant difference is the effect of the two different sets of stories. There are (today) those people who love the tales of King Arthur. Some of them from time to time write a new fictional account of those halcyon days; most satisfy themselves with reading as many of the tales as can be found. Some will even dress up (generally once a year) and come together to feast, mock joust, and sing ballads and recite poetry. Even this extreme example of devotion to the Camelot theme is, however, limited to a very few people in recent times and select few areas of the world. By contrast, the Gospels changed the course of Western history. Devotion to Jesus is (and has been for the past 2000 years) central to the lives of individuals and nations throughout the world, and that without regard to socioeconomic status. Christianity has been the primary force in promoting literacy, establishing universties, hospitals, and orphanages. It was Christians who birthed modern science, abolished slavery, and founded democracy. Whereas encountering the fictional tales of Camelot may provide one with a few hours a year of comfortable entertainment, the disovery of the Gospels--and the One about whom they are written--has cured alcholics, saved marriages and families, changed careers, and led to life-long, comprehensive personal commitments that have included self-sacrifice and even martyrdom. This last aspect alone is sufficient for demonstrating the fallaciousness of Dawkins' analogy: no one has ever willingly died for the sake of defending the truth of Arthur's kingship.

It is clear that Richard Dawkins doesn't like the fact that the Christian message continues to have such a central role in the lives of individuals and nations; that, after all, is the reason for his book. But far from showing Christian theism to be an erroneous worldview, Dawkins' efforts toward this goal merely provide us with a veritable treasure store of errors in critical thinking.

Stanley Miller

I recently learned that scientist Stanley Miller passed away last month. Does the name sound familiar? In the early 1950's, it was Miller--and his graduate advisor Harold Urey--who caused euphoria among naturalistic scientists by demonstrating that amino acids (critical building blocks of living things) could be produced in the lab from the sorts of molecules that were believed to have existed on the early Earth. This success launched Miller to instant notoriety and guaranteed him a place of some prominence in the history of science. Indeed, even today many biology textbooks present the Miller-Urey experiments as evidence for a naturalistic origin of life on Earth.

Miller was a very good scientist, and one whose innovative research did a great deal to advance our understanding of life and its origin. But 50 years after those initial experiments, just what is that understanding? Is Miller's lasting legacy the providing of the first steps in a completely naturalistic scenario for how life came to exist?

Well, actually, no. Origins-of-life researchers are unanimous in recognizing that the hypothesized early Earth conditions that the experiments simulated were incorrect, and thus that the results are irrelevant to the origins problem. Open-minded scientists will also acknowledge that every step of the experiments required intelligent input (from the researchers themselves) to prevent contamination by unwanted molecules and to stop the reactions as soon as the desired amino acids were produced (knowing that they would immediately dissolve back into inorganic molecules otherwise). Indeed, Miller's ultimate legacy may well be that he initiated the research that led to the conclusion that the origin of life through strictly natural processes is an intractable problem. According to Hubert Yockey (information theorist/molecular biologist), the consistent failure of all attempts to solve the origin-of-life problem arises from the fact that "there is no solution."

Miller operated--as have most subsequent origin-of-life researchers--within a naturalistic paradigm. And it is this artificial constraint--this arbitrary limiting of the possible answers--that has doomed such research to failure.

Cell biologist Fazale Rana and astronomer Hugh Ross--in their book Origins of Life--contrast the predictions shared by naturalistic models and those of their biblical model. In each case, the evidence available to us today supports the biblical model and refutes predictions made by naturalists. Naturalistic models predict that life arose once, late in Earth's history, gradually, over a long period of time, and that the simplest life was just that--simple. But the evidence, in agreement with the biblical model, is that life's minimum complexity is far above what used to be believed, and that life arose suddenly, early, and numerous times. Again, whereas all naturalistic models (except those that include panspermia, the idea that life arose elsewhere and was subsequently seeded to Earth) involve a prebiotic soup (a rich terrestrial, aquatic, or atmospheric concentration of the proper elements for building life molecules), the evidence indicates that such a soup never existed.

Of course, Miller's research will continue to be taught uncritically as an important piece of the puzzle. This is because metaphysical naturalists still have a stranglehold on how science is taught. But when and where evidence again becomes admissible in such scientific questions, Miller's important research will be rightly recognized as contributing to the conclusion that life did not and could not arise through strictly natural processes.

Revering the Universe

Richard Dawkins begins The God Delusion with a personal story of his own sense of wonder at the universe. We are expected to find his sense of awe deserving of respect and to question any respect we might hold for those who revere an immaterial Being transcendent to that universe. Throughout the book, Dawkins displays his inability to understand the idea that the God of Christian theism is so much more awesome and glorious than His creation. This inability ensures that Dawkins' entire project is nothing more than a straw-man argument, dealing with mischaracterizations of Christianity rather than the real thing.

Early on, Dawkins quotes favorably the late astronomer Carl Sagan (writing in Pale Blue Dot):

How is it that hardly any major religion has looked at science and concluded, 'This is better than we thought! The Universe is much bigger than our prophets said, grander, more subtle, more elegant'? Instead they say, 'No, no, no! My god is a little god, and I want him to stay that way.' A religion, old or new, that stressed the magnificence of the universe as revealed by modern science might be able to draw forth reserves of reverence and awe hardly tapped by the conventional faiths.

There's a great deal with which to take issue here, but I'll confine myself to a few quick observations.

As an encapsulization of Sagan's and Dawkins' religious affinities, this is a good one. Each worships the universe itself and reveres science as the only way of knowing things. This religious position is variously known as naturalism, naturalistic materialism, and pantheism, and includes the (self-refuting) views known as scientism and physicalism. Sagan and (more particularly) Dawkins would like us all to share their religious view, to worship the universe (which, for Sagan at least, should be capitalized). That's fine.

But Dawkins' book purports to show that Christianity is false. That being the case, the Sagan quote about major religions in general and Dawkins' use of it seem irrelevant at best and self-defeating at worst. You see, Christianity is the "major religion" that gave birth to science and the only worldview that provides the logical grounding for continuing science (see my blog posts of 3 Feb and 6 Feb of this year). The founders of science recognized their explorations of the universe as attempts to "think God's thoughts after Him." To the extent that science reveals even more grandeur, subtlety, and elegance in the universe, the logical Christian response is to feel and express ever greater wonder at and reverence for the Creator of it.

Moreover, the Christian (and Jewish) Scriptures are replete with admonitions to study and marvel at the universe, the Earth, and its inhabitants, and even to learn more about the Creator through such study. Of course (and this is perfectly reasonable), those same Scriptures are careful to warn people against worshipping the creation rather than the Creator, a problem common to Sagan and Dawkins.

Now I recognize that many who profess Christianity are guilty of what Sagan laments--putting God in a box and denying evidence about the vastness and grandeur of creation because it is at odds with their interpretation of certain Scriptures. But the validity of Christianity is not ascertained by examining how some of its aherents (or professors) behave as much as by what its Scriptures teach. Quite simply, the Bible portrays the universe as marvelous beyond our comprehension and yet the Creator as far exceeding even it in glory.

As an aside, I frankly much prefer to worship God with others who share the sort of wonder at creation that Scripture affirms. I think I've found a local church full of such folks. Central Oregon, with its high desert, magnificent mountains, and wealth of rivers and forests, somehow seems to bring out an appreciation of nature and (for those willing to acknowledge Him) reverence for its Creator. It's a shame that Sagan never experienced the sort of reverence and awe regularly expressed at Antioch.

Fallacious Dawkins

I trust by now that most of you realize that Richard Dawkins' extremely popular book, The God Delusion, is anything but a well-reasoned refutation of Christianity. His errors in critical thinking are so many and varied that atheist philosopher Michael Ruse has written that Dawkins' book "makes me embarrassed to be an atheist."

In our Adult Education class at Antioch, we've read through chapter 3, and have been appalled by the unfounded assertions and poor reasoning. This week, I'm preparing a summary of introductory logic and, specifically, a list of some of the most common informal logical fallacies. As I do this, it has been borne in upon me that Dawkins--in his "argumentation"--provides wonderful illustrations of virtually all of these errors in thinking.

In an earlier post, which I titled "The Cosmological Argument" (May 12), I quoted Dawkins and pointed out a category fallacy whereby he asked of the God of Christianity--who is by definition an uncreated, necessary Being--"who created Him?" In that same quote, Dawkins is guilty of a fallacy known as "argumentum ad futuris"--an appeal to the future. In lieu of a transcendent God, he prefers "a big bang singularity or other physical concept as yet unknown." It is, of course, logically absurd to suggest that something (like the big bang singularity) could create itself. It is also fallacious (argumentum ad futuris) to base one's argument on hypothetical future discoveries. Dawkins must do so, however, because the evidence available to us at present overwhelmingly supports a biblical--not a naturalist--worldview.

Look for more classic illustrations--courtesy of Richard Dawkins--of informal logical fallacies in future posts.

"Berra's Blunder"

Ask the average person today what evidence they think there is to support the theory of evolution, and most will name the fossil record and (more recently) the fact that the same gentic code is shared by all living things. In my last post, I argued that the genetic code fits the Judeo-Christian explanation as well as it fits Darwinian theory. I want to now make the same claim for the fossil record.

With regard to both the genetic code and the fossil record, I believe a much stronger case can be made for Christian theism than for evolution as the best explanation. But as in my last post, my purpose here is more modest; I hope to use a simple analogy to demonstrate that evolution is not the only--or even the likeliest--conclusion to be drawn from the relevant evidence.

Many people have been led to confuse the fossil record itself with the popular (though problem-plagued) Darwinian explanation for it. The fossil record does reveal that different life forms inhabited the earth at different times. Darwinian evolutionary theory, however, is just one of many attempts to explain this record. Other explanations include punctuated equilibrium theory, intelligent design theory, old-earth creationism, and directed panspermia (the theory that life was seeded here by intelligent beings from elsewhere in the universe).* Proponents of each of these theories agree that the life forms inhabiting earth exhibited differences through time. Based on the evidence, however, they disagree with the notion that earlier species evolved into later species as Darwin hypothesized.

This confusion—of the fossil record itself with a particular explanation for it—was well (albeit inadvertently) illustrated by evolutionist Tim Berra. In attempting to defend Darwinism, Berra used the analogy of a series of car models.

If you compare a 1953 and a 1954 Corvette, side by side, then a 1954 and a 1955 model, and so on, the descent with modification is overwhelmingly obvious. This is what [paleontologists] do with fossils, and the evidence is so solid and comprehensive that it cannot be denied by reasonable people.

This may be a fair analogy for what we see at certain places in the fossil record, but it supports Darwinism only if Corvettes evolve by strictly natural processes, without the involvement of any designers (or manufacturers). Of course, they do not. Berra’s analogy demonstrates that—of the explanations posited for the history of life—intelligent design, old-earth creationism, and even directed panspermia find more support from the fossil record than do Darwinian evolution or other naturalistic theories. This, of course, was not Berra’s intent, and his use of this analogy has been called—by Phillip Johnson—“Berra’s Blunder.” Johnson notes that this blunder was published following review by a number of other scientists. In other words, this muddled thinking—mistaking common design for common ancestry—is prevalent among the biological and educational communities today.



* I do not here include "Flood Geology" because, at least in my opinion, this explanation does not really seek to interact (as do the other ideas listed) with the available evidence. Rather, its validity depends largely on a mischaracterization of the fossil record, a denial of much of the relevant data.