Central to the 'argumentation' of New Atheists Richard Dawkins and Christopher Hitchens is the claim that belief in God is no different than belief in the Tooth Fairy. The logic here is so sophmoric (and so embarrassing to clear-thinking atheists) that it seems silly to have to address it. But we live in a culture in which edgy sound bites and nonsense that panders to our self-centeredness seem to trump reason every time. So I guess it would be worthwhile to spell out what's wrong with this popular claim, for the sake of the few out there who still care about truth.
The central informal logical fallacy being committed here is the faulty analogy.* When one argues by analogy, he points to similarities between two things, and then argues that on the basis of those similarities, we ought to draw the same conclusion about the one that we have already drawn about the other.
There are ways in which, claim Dawkins and Hitchens, belief in God and belief in the Tooth Fairy are quite similar. And since we all realize that belief in the Tooth Fairy is silly, we ought to come to realize that belief in God is also silly.
Such an argument is deemed faulty (and fallacious) when the similarities between the two things are insignificant and unimportant relative to their differences. And such is clearly the case here.
What similarities are there between belief in God and belief in the Tooth Fairy?
Well, first of all, there's the word 'belief.' But that can't be argued as a similarity, since that word apllies to everything we might discuss. That is, atheism shares the same thing, in that it is belief in no God.
To put it another way, every truth claim (every statement) is the expression of belief. And knowledge is a particular kind of belief, namely justified, true belief. And where no one ever argues that belief in the Tooth Fairy is either true or justified, there are millions throughout human history who have argued persuasively that belief in God is both justified and true. (Indeed, it is much more difficult to make a case for atheism as justified or true, and that is partly why that belief has always been a minority belief.)
Second, both God and the Tooth Fairy can't be seen. But here again, this similarity seems rather trivial. We take as justified, true belief, a host of beliefs about things that can't be seen. Scientists claim knowledge of such things as protons and electrons, quarks (and even Higgs' boson), and dark matter, none of which can be seen. So invisiblity is not a worthwhile criterion for accepting or rejecting the existence of something.
Perhaps what Dawkins and Hitchens have in mind is that both God and the Tooth Fairy are immaterial. But this is unsatisfactory as well. There exist a great number of things that are likewise immaterial, things such as thoughts, emotions, memories, desires, and yes, even minds and souls. And if the claim is made that these things do not exist or are in fact (somehow) material, that claim itself involves circular reasoning
(the conclusion can only be reached by first denying even the possibility of the existence of immaterial things, that is, by first adopting a naturalistic, materialistic worldview).
The list of possible, significant similarities (between belief in God and belief in the Tooth Fairy) has dwindled to nearly nil. There remains one other possibility.
Perhaps the similarity that would make this analogy meaningful is that neither the existence of God nor the existence of the Tooth Fairy can be proved. Unfortunately, this idea also has a number of problems. In fact, so many are the problems with this claim, that they warrant a separate post.
For now, though, we have seen that there is no meaningful and significant similarity between belief in God and belief in the Tooth Fairy (with the possible exception of the idea--to be addressed next--that the existence of each is similarly unprovable). It remains to examine the important and significant differences between the two things. We'll address those in the second post following, and will see that Dawkins' and Hitchens' claim here is a glaring and absurd example of the fallacy of the faulty analogy.
* It's also, of course, a straw-man argument, in which the God being argued against is not (as the claimants imply) the God of the Bible but a gross mischaracterization of that God, one that is easy to knock down.
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3 comments:
"The central informal logical fallacy being committed here is the faulty analogy.
There are ways in which, claim Dawkins and Hitchens, belief in God and belief in the Tooth Fairy are quite similar. And since we all realize that belief in the Tooth Fairy is silly, we ought to come to realize that belief in God is also silly."
The central informal logical fallacy being committed here is the 'missing the point' fallacy.
Dawkins' and Hitchens' reason for comparing God to the Tooth Fairy is, claims Gerhardt, that "belief in God and belief in the Tooth Fairy are quite similar. And since we all realize that belief in the Tooth Fairy is silly, we ought to come to realize that belief in God is also silly."
But really the comparison is about the nature of evidence and how we justify claims of knowledge, not about any supposed superficial similarities between two non-existent entities. The similarity is in their equal lacking of evidence. I.e. zero good evidence for the Tooth Fairy is the same as zero good evidence for God. 0 = 0.
The point is this: The reason we don't believe in the Tooth Fairy is not because it is silly, but because we don't have any good evidence that such a thing exists. Likewise, by the same reasoning process, the reason we don't believe in God is not because it is silly, but because we don't have any good evidence that such a thing exists.
Also, it's not because we can't see them. We can't see electrons either, but we *do* have evidence of the existence of electrons, as anyone who's taken highs-chool physics or chemistry knows. There is no such evidence for either God or the Tooth Fairy.
Also, it's not because they are immaterial. Gravity is immaterial too, but we *do* have evidence of the existence of gravity, as anyone who's taken high-school physics (or even simply heard the story of Newton and the apple) knows. There is no such evidence for either God or the Tooth Fairy.
If you don't like the Tooth Fairy, because it offends your delicate sensitivities, then simply replace the Tooth Fairy with any other god of any other religion. The Christian rejects all these other gods because there is no good evidence that such gods exist. The Christian is an atheist to thousands of other gods. We simply believe in one less god than Christians do.
"When you understand why you dismiss all other gods, you will understand why I dismiss yours." - Stephen Roberts
Wonderist:
Thanks for reading.
Your comment, though somewhat rambling, is largely in agreement with what I've written. You dismiss (as I did in my post) the superficial similarities between the Tooth Fairy and God, things like invisibility and immateriality. And your central claim is that the primary similarity to which Dawkins is seeking to turn our attention is the epistemological one--proof or evidence. I believe you're right, and that's why (toward the end of my post) I clearly stated that I was reserving that issue for a separate post.
I might point out, parenthetically, that Dawkins' argument is not as clear as you and I have made it. It seems as though it would serve his purpose just as well if some of his readers did find satisfaction in the superficial similarities (between God and the Tooth Fairy) that you and I have rightly dismissed.
But since you and I have seen that these other similarities are superficial, we can spend our time addressing the last remaining similarity, that of evidence/proof. I will do that (as I promised in that post) in the next.
So, I'm not sure how you can accuse me of 'missing the point,' simply because I choose to take more than one post to address the nature of this faulty analogy. (Curb this impatience, young atheist!)
Lastly, I'll address what I perceive to be a misunderstanding in your view of the exclusivity of Christians. To be sure, we dismiss the existence of the gods of pantheist religions, and that for the reason you suggest--there is no evidence that there is a god in the sun, in the seas, in the tree in the back yard.
But (as I will discuss in the next post), we find a good deal of evidence and reason that supports the existence of the single, transcendent Creator God of the other two great monotheist religions--Judaism and Islam. We take those religions seriously precisely because their beliefs are largely consistent with the evidence available to us from the universe around us. And we do not dismiss either of those religions as completely false. Rather, we reject those specific claims of Judaism and Islam that fail the twin tests of reason and evidence.
More in the next post.
By the way, I've studied a bit of logic and have never come across the 'missing the point' fallacy. Did you make that up?
Jordan:
I appreciate your frustration. It is indeed difficult to argue with people who begin with false assumptions and are unable to get outside of their false paradigm.
For the most part, such are immune to good argumentation, since they have already chosen to settle for poor thinking. When you point out the flaw in their thinking (as, for example, the circular reasoning of the materialists you bring up), the person most likely to benefit from your argument is the third party listening in, not the dogmatic materialist making the false claim.
There are several problems with the materialist claims you have related. First, the claim that science cannot address immaterial things is a very modern claim that is itself unjustified. (I have written on this many times, but) a big part of the problem is that scientists have little or no training in the philosophy of science. The experts in what science is and is not (and thus on the issue of whether science addresses only material things) are not scientists but philosophers of science. And those experts are unanimous in declaring that no set of criteria for discriminating between science and non-science has ever been succesfully defended. More to the point, they are unanimous in declaring as bogus the claim that "science studies only material things."
But let's adopt--for the sake of argument--that claim, that science is (artificially) constrained to study only material things. One cannot logically arrive from that single premise to the offered conclusion, that 'therefore immaterial things must not exist.'
Instead, if scientists voluntarily (and unnecessarily) constrain their discipline to addressing only material things, then they have actually disqualified themselves from commenting on the existence of such things.
What they certainly cannot (reasonably) do is allow only material explanations and then conclude that they have proven the non-existence of immaterial things. This is circular reasoning of the most obvious kind, and logically fallacious.
Again, the materialist may be unwilling to accept this, but those bystanders open to thinking clearly and discovering truth should benefit from such a reasoned response.
Thanks for reading!
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