Confusing Legality and Justice

One of the characteristics of the postmodern age in which we live is a great deal of confusion on the issues of morality, justice, right and wrong. This confusion has infiltrated the church, which is not surprising. And one facet of that larger confusion is a tendency to equate legality with justice (or right) and illegality with unjust (or wrong). It came up the other day--among Christians--in this way...

The issue was immigration reform, and the pastor was bringing our attention to the fact that God--in both the Old and New Testaments--seems to care about the alien, the stranger, the foreigner, the displaced person. The pastor shared several passages--and could have shared many more--in which God called/calls His people to speak up for and have compassion upon this group of people. The response by more than one Christian listener was, in effect,

But don't you see, these people are illegal aliens--they are breaking the law.

Now, there are a number of problems with this naive, insensitive, simplistic response, but my point in this post is to point out only one. And that one is that it is a mistake to equate legality with right (moral, or just) and likewise a mistake to equate illegality with wrong (immoral, or unjust).

With a Christian, my response to such a question might be to say, "Oh, so you are in favor of abortions, huh?" Now, most followers of Christ who rightly understand that issue find it morally reprehensible to kill human persons just because they are still in the womb and we're bigger than they are. So I would hope that the Christian to whom I am talking would be taken aback by my assuming that he favors abortion. But my assuming that is my way of granting him consistency in his approach to morality. Because if he deals with the issue of immigration simply by asking himself "What does the law say?" then why wouldn't he do the same with other moral issues, like abortion? In the latter case, the law says that abortion is okay.

No, the reason we think abortion is wrong is because morality, righteousness, and justice are grounded in a higher standard--an absolute standard residing in the mind of the Creator of the universe. As Christians, we speak out against Roe v. Wade because we believe that the resulting human law is at odds with God's law regarding the sanctity of every human life.

And whether one believes in a Creator or not, the fact is that the entire legislative process seems to assume that the law as now written may be inadequate, may be in need of tweaking or improving. The reason we elect legislators is because we believe that there need to be changes made to reflect more closely still what is really right. (Of course, this is one of those areas in which street-level postmodernism is most clearly seen to be absurd. If there is no transcendent standard--no absolute morality found in God or elsewhere--then one cannot carry out legal or moral reform. One can claim to have changed the law, but one cannot claim to have improved the law.)

Immigration is an extremely complex issue, and most Americans recognize that comprehensive reform is much-needed. What bothers me is that the "Christian" voices heard most loudly on this issue seem to be simplistic and unthinking, and not at all in line with the teachings of Christ and the Bible. If there is a uniquely Judeo-Christian perspective that needs to be insinuated into this discussion, it likely has little to do with a sort of political party-line of tightening the laws, and much to do with the image of God found in every human being, including the alien about whom God so clearly reveals His concern in His Word to us.

The Black Vote on Prop 8

In the last post, I addressed the question (arising out of the aftermath of California's Proposition 8), "Why are homosexuals in California behaving as terrorists?" In this post, I want to address a second question, to wit,

Why did blacks overwhelmingly vote for Prop 8, in favor of traditional marriage?

Now, there are undoubtedly a number of reasons that could rightly be offered, and I in no way want to suggest that mine is the primary one. Nonetheless, I think it worth a mention.

I believe it has been a gross strategical error on the part of gays and lesbians to seek to equate their efforts with the civil rights movement. At best, this equation is a faulty analogy; at worst it trivializes the great injustices perpetrated on people of color and the sacrifice and suffering that they went through (and go through) to see those injustices end.

An analogy is faulty (and thus fallacious) when the differences (between the two things compared) are more significant and central than the similarities. In the case of civil rights and "same-sex marriage," the similarity is this... two groups, both minorities, desired a change in the laws affecting them.

Here are some of the differences... Blacks were (and are) being denied basic rights available to everyone else. These included job opportunities, educational opportunities, the right to eat, ride, and sleep where others (of the majority) were allowed. As a result, blacks were underpaid, undereducated, second-class citizens in every way. By contrast, homosexuals are not denied education, job opportunities, or any other rights. Homosexuals in America have more education and higher income than the average citizen, and can eat, ride, and sleep wherever they want. They are denied no rights offered everyone else.

Indeed, gays and lesbians can even get married just like anyone else. The problem is that they don't want to enter into the longtime, heterosexual commitment that is (and always has been) marriage. What's more, no one is preventing them from engaging in the relationships that they have chosen. So, the only thing that they lack is the wholesale respect and blessing of their aberrant relationships by the public at large, and the minor financial incentives that the government has offered to married couples. Parenthetically, the government has recognized the importance to a nation of strong traditional families; while it is apparent that homosexuals would benefit (at significant cost to the rest) from such incentives if marriage were redefined, there doesn't seem to be any benefit to the nation or government for so promoting such alliances.)

It really isn't any wonder that blacks do not tend to buy into the gay agenda; they have every reason to be outraged at the claim that "gay rights" are an extension of the courageous fight for equality in which people of color have been engaged for so long. This problem is probably too obvious (to most of my readers) to even warrant this post, but it seems that homosexuals can't somehow see it.

Prop 8

I thought it might be worthwhile to answer a couple of questions that arise out of the passage of California's Proposition 8 and the resulting violence...

1) Why are homosexuals in California behaving as terrorists?

In general, terrorists believe that the ends they desire cannot be achieved peacefully, meaning either through logical argumentation (or negotiation) or political means. In California, homosexuals were hoping to receive approval for their relationships through the political process (activist judges), but Proposition 8--which affirmed marriage as between one man and one woman--was passed by the voters of their state. This puts them between a rock and a hard place, because the other peaceful means (logic) doesn't work for them. Let me put it another way.

The question of whether a state should redefine marriage to include the union of two men or of two women is a question of morality. And when wrestling with a particular moral question, the larger question that naturally frames it is, "Where does morality come from?" or "On what do we base morality?" Homosexuals, as you might expect, reject the traditional answer, objectivism, which says that there is a transcendent Natural Law to which we seek to conform our national, state, or local laws. The reason gays and lesbians cannot appeal to that Law is that it ends up defining marriage as between one man and one woman. Despite the fact that homosexuality has been around throughout human history (and even, to varying degrees accepted as an alternate sexual preference), there has been no society that has sought to confuse it or to equate it with marriage, which has always been understood as applying to heterosexual individuals. Once accept a transcendent Moral Law (and a moral Law-Giver), and the gay agenda is doomed.

But there's another option in our postmodern society, and that's what's known as conventionalism. Conventionalism represents a denial of objective morality in favor of the view that "one ought to behave according to the dictates of one's own culture" (this view is also known as prescriptive cultural relativism). This understanding of morality has fatal logical flaws (as I discussed here), but that's beside the present point.

Here's what's happening in California... Homosexuals cannot receive the societal respect and blessing they crave through appealing to objective morality. So their only hope (for achieving that goal peacefully) was through legal means, by convincing rogue judges (those willing to go beyond interpreting the law to creating the law) to side with them. But then along comes a referendum ballot--which is quintessentially a conventionalist approach--arguing the contrary (traditional) view of marriage. As long as the vote on Prop 8 was still undecided, an appeal to convention as endorsing their untraditional view of marriage was still a live option. But Prop 8 didn't go their way, and where does that leave gays and lesbians in California?

They still cannot appeal to objective morality, because it argues against a homosexual relationship being called 'marriage.' Nor can they (now) appeal to a conventional understanding of morality, because the convention that holds in California is that marriage is heterosexual. They lose either way. I feel sorry for them (in more ways than one), at least those among them that haven't in the election aftermath resorted to terrorism.

Next post, "Why did blacks overwhelmingly vote for Prop 8?"

Illegitimate Use of Terms

I finished the last post with this thought:

If, in attempting to support a particular position, you frequently find yourself using terms that logically belong only to the opposite position, it's time to rethink your paradigm.

I meant it particularly with regard to scientific materialists (evolutionists) who have to remind themselves daily that the design that confronts them everywhere they turn is only apparent--and who (as demonstrated by the journalist of the human backbone article) have to watch their words lest they betray the poverty of their view.

Another class of folks who run into the same problem, though, are the moral relativists. For those who believe that there is no absolute morality--no standard of good or bad--it is illegitimate to use terms like "should" or "ought." And yet nobody can have any meaningful interactions with other people for very long without using these and other terms that express moral values or judgments.

The Fall of Mankind

I'm doing a research paper on the biblical doctrine of the fall of mankind (of Adam). In the process, I've been reminded that this understanding of humanity--that we are fallen--is unique to Judeo-Christianity (or very nearly so). And yet, it seems that it should be obvious that any worldview that doesn't acknowledge moral evil and provide a reasonable account for it is inadequate. As philosopher William Hasker comments,

Surely one of the acid tests for a world view is whether it is able to provide a consistent, coherent, and acceptable account of the nature of humanity.

And if the past century has taught us anything--with its world wars and its repeated genocides--it is that there is something of depravity in human nature. (Or, if you don't want to consider the past century, simply read a newspaper or watch the evening news.) The biblical worldview does address this aspect of human nature, and the understanding that man is fallen is a central teaching of Christianity. As C.S. Lewis has it,

Christianity simply does not make sense until you have faced the [sin issue]. Christianity tells people to repent and promises them forgiveness. It therefore has nothing (as far as I know) to say to people who do not know they have done anything to repent of and who do not feel that they need any forgiveness. It is after you have realised that there is a real Moral Law, and a Power behind the law… and not a moment sooner, that Christianity begins to talk.

So, much of the Christian worldview's explanatory power resides in its accurate description of man's fundamental problem. The great news, of course, is that Christianity doesn't leave us there, but also describes the miraculous redemption of mankind planned by God and fulfilled in His eternal Son!

Ironically Intolerant

As we have seen, those who espouse moral relativism quickly fall into contradiction. It is no surprise then, that the postmodern form of tolerance turns out to produce extreme intolerance on the part of its advocates. According to one political analyst,

Absolute tolerance is altogether impossible. The alledgedly absolute tolerance turns into ferocious hatred of those who have stated clearly and most forcefully that there are unchangeable standards founded in the nature of man and the nature of things.

This was penned decades ago (in Liberalism Ancient and Modern) by Leo Strauss. If Strauss was describing the situation in his day, he was also prophesying of ours.

In our culture, those who openly take a stand for objective morality--which we have seen is the accurate, logical understanding of reality--are vilified and persecuted by those whose only moral cry is "Tolerance!" And the irony is that the relativists cannot see that they are blatantly refuting their stated position.

When a relativist, in referring to his university, civic organization, or other group, advocates diversity and tolerance, he doesn't really mean that he desires the company of a diversity of views. If so, he would be thrilled to have a group of moral objectivists--and even fundamentalist Christians--included. But chances are, he wants nothing to do with such folk, and hopes all the others in his group feel the same. No, what he really wants is people of a diversity of nationalities, skin colors, genders, and gender orientation who share the exact same ideology as he does.

And there is nothing tolerant or diverse about such a group of bigoted idealogues.

Dog-Fighting and Morality

Much of my argument against moral relativism and for moral objectivism has been based on intuition. That is, while moderns may find it easy to say that morality is a personal, subjective thing--and that no objective morality exists--we nonetheless understand intuitively that concepts like right and wrong, justice and fairness, good and evil, and moral improvement, really do have meaning. We cannot avoid using moral language in our everyday speech, and we intuitively live our lives as though moral objectivism is true.

An example of this comes from one of the top news stories of the past week (and one to which, in its earlier stages, I alluded way back when I launched this series on morality with a couple of sports comments).

Atlanta Falcons quarterback Michael Vick has now pled guilty to crimes associated with operating an illegal dog-fighting ring out of his home. He is expected to face prison time for these crimes, which alledgedly include some rather heinous executions (of losing or under-performing dogs) which Vick oversaw or carried out.

The public outcry against these crimes has been enormous (and rightly so). And this would seem to prove my point--that no matter how we talk about morality in guarded conversation, we all recognize when an evil act has been committed.

In the Vick case, all of the human participants were agreed that what was going on was fun and exciting (all were consenting adults, if you will). Until the story leaked, no one was being harmed by what these fun-loving gentlemen were doing in the privacy of Vick's home and grounds. (Indeed, even after the incidents became known, it could be argued that none of us was hurt by the carryings-on.)

But people across the nation are outraged by these acts, with columnists and callers to talk-shows crying for justice. The events themselves and their subsequent revelation have galvanized our collective sense that these things are wrong, that the men involved were behaving cruelly, and that they ought to be punished.

No one is saying--as would be consistent with moral relativism--that these guys were merely following the dictates of their own moral code and thus should be left alone. Moreover, it would be a reach to suggest that our outlawing of such acts is merely for society's benefit, that while such cruelty itself is morally neutral, it is society's good that is somehow affected. No, we all recognize that some things simply are wrong, that people who do those things are acting contrary to an objective standard, and that they ought to be punished and the evil activity stopped.

The outcry against the misdeeds of Michael Vick and the calls that justice be done here only make sense in a world in which there exists an objective moral standard. The incoherent position known as moral relativism has been taking a well-deserved beating as this dog-fighting scandal has unfolded.

The Self-Refuting Nature of Relativism

I've spent the last couple of weeks discussing moral relativism and the redefining of tolerance. Those who have followed along will have seen for themselves just how illogical (dare I say silly?) these postmodern views are. Those who hold these views do so uncritically--had they thought very deeply about them, they would quickly have come up against the contradictory and self-refuting nature of these sorts of claims.

Lest this is not obvious, let me relate a sample dialogue, one that begins with a ubiquitous, almost-daily-heard assertion. (We'll designate the asserter "PM" for "Postmodernist" and his interlocutor "Oddball," a nickname for "Independent, Critical Thinker.")

PM: It's wrong to judge another person!

Oddball: Then why are you judging me?

Or, as a slight variant,

PM: Nobody should push their morality on any one else.

Oddball: That seems to be your morality. Why are you pushing it?

Again, there are two contrary views here. Either moral relativism is an accurate account of the world in which we live or moral objectivism is true. And because relativism has the many fatal flaws about which I've been posting, philosophers are virtually unanimous in rejecting it. That is, the people who think logically recognize the bankruptcy of the postmodern position regarding morality and tolerance. This includes not only Christians (and other theists) but philosophers of every metaphysical stance. (Christians and other theists attribute the objective moral code to a transcendent Lawgiver, while atheists ground it in evolution or human nature.)

Nonetheless, moral relativism is the spirit of the age, and is taught in public schools and universities, through television, radio, and movies, and is accepted uncritically by most of our culture, much to our shame and further ignorance.

Redefining Tolerance

We've already seen that moral relativism (in all its flavors) is an untenable view, and one that no one can live out consistently. We've also seen that the existence of tolerance, the hallmark virtue of relativism, provides further evidence for moral objectivism and against relativism.

But what we need to do today is to unpack tolerance and see how it has been redefined in our postmodern culture. Again, we will see that this redefining involves some pretty shoddy thinking.

Throughout history, tolerance has meant that respect is to be accorded to persons, and specifically to persons with whose ideas we disagree. In today's muddled culture, it is common to believe that it is different--and often contradictory--ideas themselves to which tolerance is to be applied and respect extended. One doesn't have to think too hard to see that this is nonsense. Let's take an easy example; here's an idea:

All ideas are equally valid, and therefore deserve equal respect.

Here's another idea:

All ideas are not equally valid. Some are contradictory, and some are plainly wrong.

According to the first (the postmodern) idea, the second idea is perfectly valid, even though it states the exact opposite of the first. Agreeing with the first idea therefore leaves us hopelessly enmeshed in contradiction. In other words, the two ideas are irreconcilable if the first is true. The two statements are best reconciled by acknowledging that the second (the traditional) idea is correct, and that (therefore) the first is one of those that qualifies as plainly wrong.

There are all sorts of silly ideas. How about, "The Earth is flat!" Well, maybe that doesn't sound too silly. Maybe you haven't travelled much and don't trust the photographs that NASA gives us, allegedly taken from space. So how about this one: "The Earth sits on the back of a giant turtle!" I hope you can bring yourself to identify this as a silly idea. And while you may not be able to personally avow that "the Earth is more or less spherical in shape," it ought to be plain that it cannot be both flat and spherical and perched on a turtle's back and orbiting the sun without the aid of giant turtles all at the same time. One or more of these ideas is wrong, and it only requires one good counter example to refute the relativist's statement that all ideas are equally valid.

Tolerance is a good thing, a very important virtue, and one upon which our great nation was founded. But let's get back to understanding it aright. Tolerance means respecting other persons despite the fact that we do not agree with their ideas (political, religious, moral, or other). Tolerance does not mean kidding ourselves into thinking that all ideas (including mutually exclusive ones) are equal.

Relativism and Tolerance

If, after all I've shared this past week about the obvious problems with moral relativism, you still have some inclination toward that view, it's likely because you believe that tolerance is a worthy goal. It is, after all, a virtue that's riding an all-time high; indeed, for some (including, especially, moral relativists) tolerance is the 'boom shiggety,' the highest of all virtues.

I'll save it for another post to discuss how tolerance is misunderstood in today's culture. But for now, let's grant (and that willingly, since I believe it) that there exists a virtue known as tolerance and that people should exhibit this virtue in their dealings with others.

Here again we run into a huge problem for the moral relativist. Because while I--as a moral objectivist--can say that people should be tolerant--the relativist cannot. Words like 'should' and 'ought' are terms of moral obligation, and moral obligation is exactly what relativists deny. If there are no objective moral absolutes--as the relativist claims--then tolerance is not one either. Put another way, if every individual has the right to make up his own ethical principles, then there is no way of judging or blaming the individual who chooses to make intolerance the core of his morality.

You see, one cannot make a case for moral relativism on the basis of tolerance, nor can one make the case for tolerance from a position of moral relativism.

If tolerance is a virtue, then moral objectivism must be true.

What's Wrong with I.E.R. (6)

We've already discussed a number of significant problems with the view known as moral relativism. Relativists can't accuse others of wrong-doing. They can't appeal to the problem of evil as a complaint against God. They can neither place blame nor accept praise. They cannot label anything as just or fair or unjust or unfair. And they cannot improve their morality.

Another thing that is utterly inconsistent for someone espousing moral relativism is to engage in moral discussions. Meaningful discourse about ethical issues can only be undertaken by people who believe in moral objectivism. Ethical discussions (which includes most political discussions) are all about weighing moral alternatives, attempting to decide which view is more ethical. But if--as the moral relativist believes--all views are equally valid, then there's no point in speaking or listening.

Now it seems that there is a great deal of interest in discussing such things as the war in Iraq. Should we have invaded Iraq? Was there good justification for doing so, or was our President misguided, wrong, or even deceitful? Should we withdraw immediately, or is there still good to be done there? Are Iraqis capable of self-government without tyranny? Can democracy even be expected to work in that culture? Are the lives of American men and women more valuable than the lives of tens of thousands of Iraqis who suffered and died under Hussein?

These seem to be important questions, questions about which almost everyone in America has some opinion. But the one group who--if consistent--disqualifies itself from the discussion is those who espouse moral relativism. As the rest of us (those who believe in moral objectivism) carry out our heated discussions, we would be right to ignore any opinion or argument offered by a relativist, and that because we understand the relativist's larger claim. To the relativist, a person's moral view is nothing more than a personal preference, like a favorite flavor of ice cream. I should listen carefully and seriously to the arguments given against my own position by someone who accepts that right and wrong are objective sorts of things. But when someone I know to be a relativist interjects that (for example) "All war is wrong" or "Bush lied about WMDs," I should give that no more consideration than if she had said "I don't like brussel sprouts."

But moral relativists tend not to be consistent. Because they live in the real world, they do have opinions about ethical issues, and they like to share those opinions as much as the next fellow. You see, the only way to be utterly consistent to a stance of moral relativism is to remain completely silent on any issue that remotely involves concepts like good and bad, right and wrong, justice and fairness. That's why nobody lives consistently as a moral relativist.

What's Wrong with I.E.R. (5)

When we discussed cultural relativism, we acknowledged that one absurdity entailed in it is that what we call moral reformers would actually be immoral for acting against the dictates of their culture. Individual ethical relativism has a similar problem. If this view were true, no one could improve their morality. Upon reflecting deeply on an ethical issue, they could decide to change their view; but it would be incoherent to say that any change was an improvement. If there is no moral standard against which to compare one's current or past moral views, then it is meaningless to suggest that one is better than the other.

If it seems more reasonable that one can improve one's morality, then (again) moral relativism is an inadequate and inaccurate view.

What's Wrong with I.E.R. (2)

A main obstacle to faith in God (and an area of doubt for believers) is the "problem of evil." How is it possible (the question is generally posed) that there exists an all-powerful, all-loving God when we see so much pain, evil, and suffering in the world? It seems (to many) that either God is not all-powerful (cannot stop suffering), or He is not all-loving (doesn't care that there is so much suffering), or both, or that He simply doesn't exist.

This constitutes a serious and reasonable challenge to the Christian faith in particular, since the Bible does clearly characterize God as both omnipotent (all-powerful) and omni-benevolent (all-loving). I believe there are good (albeit complex) answers to this problem, and I feel it behooves every serious follower of Christ to have wrestled with the question and to be able to articulate those good answers. But my purpose here today is not to address the problem itself.

Whereas the "problem of evil" does represent a serious issue to be grappled with by believers and skeptics alike, there is one worldview whose adherents are not able to raise this question. And that worldview is moral relativism.

You see, if moral relativism is true, then the concept of 'evil' is nonsensical. To refer to something as evil is to affirm a standard of morality, and that's precisely what moral relativism denies. I believe that affirming the concept of evil is incoherent in other worldviews (like materialistic naturalism), but for the moral relativist, such incoherence entails the defining core of his worldview.

So the second thing that argues against moral relativism is this... it seems intuitively reasonable to affirm the existence of evil, and with it a moral standard against which to compare evil.

What's Wrong with I.E.R. (1)

I promised 7 things that would seem to make individual ethical relativism an inadequate view of the way things really are. Tonight I want to give you the first.

If relativism is true, then we can never say that anyone else has done wrong. We cannot object on moral grounds to what the Nazis did at Auschwitz or to years of apartheid in South Africa. It is not wrong to kill thousands by flying planes into buildings, to scuttle oil-containing tankers that are no longer seaworthy, or to rape a 10-year-old girl. The relativist can only say 'I wouldn't do that' or 'I don't happen to like it when others do that,' but she cannot say 'it is wrong.'

So, if it seems that some things (racism, sex slavery, torturing toddlers for the fun of it) are simply wrong, then individual ethical relativism must not be true.

Individual Ethical Relativism

We've already discussed both descriptive cultural relativism and cultural ethical relativism, and shown that both have serious flaws that lead philosophers to reject them. There is, however, a third--and more popular--form of moral relativism, and it is this that we will examine this week.

I'm talking about individual ethical relativism, what Beckwith and Koukl call 'I Say Relativism.' Basically, it's the view that, as regards moral issues it's 'to each his own.' In other words, a given moral norm can be (to borrow from the title of Paul Copan's excellent book largely about relativism) True For You, But Not For Me. On this view, there is no absolute morality, but each individual determines what is right and what is wrong.

Before we look at what's wrong with this view, let's make it clear that this is pervasive in our culture today. To adherents to this view, tolerance is the supreme virtue, and the most heinous sin is to 'force one's morality on someone else.' (Free hint: A fatal flaw for this view is evident in what I have just written.)

Also, if this form of moral relativism fares no better than the other two we've already refuted, then what's left is moral objectivism. That is, any evidence that counts against moral relativism (also called moral subjectivism) is evidence in favor of the more traditional view that morailty is objective--that right and wrong are the sorts of things that apply equally to all people at all times.

What I'll do in the next few posts is share seven fatal flaws of individual ethical relativism. These are not original with me, and I am most indebted to Greg Koukl, who has effectively articulated these problems in his book, in lectures, on the radio, and at his website. Anyone wanting more examples or further clarification of what I discuss this week should avail himself of these resources.

The Prime Directive

A second form of moral relativism is known as conventionalism or normative ethical relativism (Beckwith and Koukl call it 'Society Says Relativism'). Whereas the moral relativism I discussed yesterday merely describes (makes the observation that different cultures exhibit different mores), this form prescribes morality on a cultural basis. Conventionalism goes beyond acknowledging that what is right in one culture might not be right in another; it says that one should follow the moral dictates of one's own society.

This view is familiar as Star Trek's 'Prime Directive'--the view that each culture's morality is equally valid and the resulting policy (inadvertently violated in nearly every episode) that Federation representatives were not to inflict the Federation's moral norms on any other cultures with which they came into contact.

At first glance, this understanding may seem somewhat reasonable and certainly tolerant, a sort of culture-level 'live and let live.' But, as Beckwith and Koukl argue in their book Relativism, there are at least three fatal flaws to this view.

First, if conventionalism is true, then there is no such thing as an immoral society. No matter how barbaric the practices of a particular culture, there can be no moral judgment made against it; that culture's morals simply are what they are. Conventionalism was essentially the defense put forth by the Nazis at Nuremberg when they were tried by the International Military Tribunal. They said, in effect,

We were following the just orders given by the leadership of our society, which orders accurately reflected the mores of our culture. What's more, the Tribunal, composed of members of cultures outside our own, has neither right nor jurisdiction to judge us for what we did.

Thankfully, the Tribunal did not accept this defense or its underlying cultural relativism. Rather, it appealed to a higher moral law, and rightly condemned the atrocities perpetrated on humanity by the Third Reich.

It likewise seems reasonable to suggest that the current genocide occurring in the Sudan and elsewhere is wrong, as is the trafficking in sex slaves taking place in southeast Asia. But if conventionalism is true, this is not the case. We can only observe such genocide and slave-trading with a sort of distaste associated with our own cultural norms; we can neither judge it nor justify any attempts to end it.

Second, if this view is accurate, then there are no such things as immoral laws or immoral governments. Any particular set of laws would, by definition, constitute the moral guidelines for that society. On this view, all moral discussion (and politics is almost entirely moral discussion) would be pointless, since the existing laws are equivalent to the society's morality. But this, too, seems extremely counterintuitive.

Likewise (and third), conventionalism leads to the conclusion that there is no such thing as moral reform or moral reformers. Indeed, if individuals should do exactly as their society says (with regard to moral issues), then moral reformers are actually acting immorally. William Wilberforce was wrong to spend the latter years of his life fighting to abolish England's slave trade. Martin Luther King, Jr. should be vilified, not honored, for demanding equality for blacks in a culture whose morals did not extend such equality. Those Germans who hid Jews or otherwise didn't cooperate with the Nazis? Yup, it was they who acted immorally, and not the Nazis themselves.

Seems kinda silly, looked at that way, doesn't it? It just seems to make more sense that there are such things as immoral cultures, immoral laws and governments, and the possibility for moral reform. Since conventionalism involves a denial of all these things, this form of moral relativism is clearly false.

In the next post, we'll begin to examine a third form of moral relativism, individual ethical relativism.

Descriptive Cultural Relativism

One type of moral relativism found in our postmodern times can be called descriptive cultural relativism. (This view is called 'Society Does Relativism' by Frank Beckwith and Greg Koukl in their excellent book, Relativism: Feet Firmly Planted in Mid-Air.) According to adherents to this view, we used to think that there existed a set of moral laws that held true for all humans in all places at all times. But that was only because of our own provincialism and naivete. Once we got out more, we discovered that other cultures held strikingly different moral values than our Western mores. Now that we know this to be the case, we can rightly dismiss the old idea that there is any one overarching morality toward which all humans should strive.

This view constitutes an anthropological description, and denies objective morality on the basis of a recognition that different cultures exhibit different moral stances. While this view may sound valid, it has at least two problems, one of which (the second one I'll discuss) is fatal.

First, it is not clear that different cultures really do have significantly different value systems. In most apparent cases of conflict, it is facts--and not values--that provide the differences.

Even in the highly charged abortion debate, all the parties share a value system that says that taking innocent human life is wrong. The debate turns on a question of facts, the issue being when does an innocent human life begin?

We believe that cannibalism is wrong, but that other animals are legitimate sources of food for us. In India, by contrast, it is taboo to eat beef. Big difference in moral values, right? Well, not really. You see, in India, they believe that the cow in question may be the reincarnation of a human being, and so their refusal to eat beef has its foundation in the same morality that prevents us from cannibalism.

Well, then, what about human tribes that really do practice cannibalism? As it turns out, cannibalism doesn't come naturally to these tribes, and learning such a practice involves a period of great emotional stress for the children of each new generation. In other words, even where the behaviors contradict more conventional mores, those behaviors are inculcated with difficulty for the very reason that they go against what seem to be universal moral norms among humans.

The second problem with descriptive cultural relativism is that it involves a fatal logical flaw. The argument looks like this:

Premise: Different cultures exhibit different moral codes.
Conclusion: There is no single morality that holds for all human beings.

The argument is fallacious, as it involves a non sequitur. The conclusion doesn't follow from the premise. This can be seen by a similar example. Let's say that my wife and I seperately attempt to compute our income tax liability, and we come up with different answers. It would be tempting to conclude that this indicates that there is no correct answer (and that, therefore, the IRS is asking us to do the impossible, and we are justified in not bothering with taxes this year). Obviously, the conclusion is wrong. There is a correct answer, even if one or both of us failed to arrive at it. In the same way, the observation that different humans or human groups do not exhibit or even profess the same moral code does not in any way demonstrate that there is no universal moral law.

Descriptive cultural relativism is logically flawed and an inaccurate assessment of the true situation with regard to morality.

No Ultimate Morality

Yesterday, I pointed out that scientific naturalism and postmodernism begin with very different epistemologies (or views of what we can know and how we know). Indeed (I argued), the latter is in some ways a reaction against the former. Nonetheless, these two worldviews are very similar with regard to morality, as both end up undermining or denying the traditional view--held throughout most of Western history--that there exists an ultimate morality that is the same for all humans.

I will spend several posts describing (and demonstrating what is wrong with) three different types of moral relativism associated with postmodernism. For now, though, let me just state that scientific naturalism likewise leads to a denial of morality.

Let me be clear here--I am not saying that atheists or materialists cannot be or are not people with high moral standards and behaviors. Many can and are. My simple point is that if there is no God--no transcendent Lawgiver--then there is no ultimate logical foundation for ascribing to any moral values. If--as on the materialist view--humans are the accidental result of purposeless evolution, then no good rational justification exists for discussing (much less enforcing) any particular moral viewpoint.

This, of course, is just one of the many lines of evidence that can be brought to bear to show that naturalism is an inaccurate depiction of reality. We all have moral intuitions--beliefs and thoughts about right and wrong, about how things ought to be--that are so foundational to who we are that we hardly even think about them. I'll develop this argument more as we examine the brands of moral relativism brought to us by postmodern thought, but when I do, try to keep in mind that that argument cuts equally against the claims of scientific materialism. The traditional "moral argument" remains powerful evidence for the existence of a transcendent God, as I will hope to demonstrate in the next week or two.

Naturalism vs. Postmodernism

I think the two most important worldviews opposing Christianity in our day and culture are naturalism and postmodernism. Both end up at the same place (at least, relative to the Christian understanding) with regard to morals (which is what I want to discuss in the next few days). This is somewhat ironic, however, in that these two worldviews are really quite different from one another, especially in their opposite epistemologies. So let me interact with that for a bit...

(Warning: I'm about to make some very simplistic and superficial statements about the origin of postmodern thinking. The actual case is much more complex. Nonetheless, I think there is validity to what I'm going to assert.)

Epistemology is a two-dollar word for the study of knowledge. When we discuss issues of truth, knowledge, and how we know things, we are talking epistemology. And materialism/naturalism and postmodernism begin with quite different epistemologies.

By and large, the naturalist has a very high view of science and of truth. Most naturalists are rational realists, believing that science makes statements that are true--that correspond to the real world 'out there.' Postmodernists do not affirm a correspondence view of truth, but suggest that our beliefs are separated from any reality 'out there' by impenetrable barriers of language and/or senses. (Some postmodernists used to claim that "There is no truth," but the self-refuting nature of that statement was all too obvious. Most now make more contorted--but, unfortunately, no less self-refuting--claims about their view.)

In a very real (though, as I've already admitted, simplistic) sense, postmodern epistemology is a reaction or defense against scientific truth claims. Here's how that works.

Science has enjoyed immense success in the past century, curing illnesses, eradicating some diseases, placing men on the moon, and generally increasing the quality of life and the understanding of our universe. In academia and in the minds of the many-headed, science is the ultimate arbiter of truth. Science is the best--if not the only--way of discovering truth and of knowing anything. In particular, the hard sciences (like physics and chemistry), with their rigid experimental design, repeatability, and predictive power, have the monopoly on truth. And this understanding is reflected (in academia, for example) in the amount of research dollars and grant money that flows into these disciplines.

This, of course, leaves professors in English, history, sociology, and such on the outside looking in (with what is known colloquially as "physics envy"). Unable to challenge the chemist on his own turf--discovering truth through scientific means--these professors in the humanities have taken a different tack--they have sought to discredit even the existence of truth. When the scientist says that only he has the methodology for discovering truth, the literature teacher responds, "Truth? What's that?"

So, whereas the naturalist has a very high view of truth and of our ability to discern truth, the postmodernist denies the existence of truth or our ability to discover it, or both. Tomorrow, I'll examine the ironically similar conclusions about morality to which these two different views arrive.

A Golf Apologetic

Yesterday's post struck a chord (two comments!), so I think I'll write a bit more about morality. But tonight, I want to do one more short sports piece.

During last week's British Open, there was a stir caused by comments made by Gary Player (veteran South African golfer). Player apparently said something to the effect that he suspected steroids were probably already on the pro tour (presumably the PGA Tour and/or the European Tour).

Now, as a Christian, I believe that all men are fallen, and so I'm not going to suggest that Player was entirely wrong in his comments. Nonetheless, I'm going to take a one-post hiatus from being a Christian apologist in order to be a golf apologist. Specifically, I'm going to give you four reasons I think golf is perhaps the least likely sport to have to worry about illegal steroid use.

Reason #4. Male professional golfers come in a variety of body shapes. Most tour pros do not conjure up the buff-ness associated with steroid use. Tiger is a very fit exception, but you'd have to think awhile to come up with another. Meanwhile, you can think of many that you just know are not benefitting from steroid use (or even the weight room). Think John Daly, Fuzzy Zoeller, or (on the other end of the spectrum) Jesper Parnevik, Charles Howell the 3rd, or Aaron Baddely.

Reason #3. Whereas a primary reason athletes in other sports take steroids is to increase strength, golfers require a delicate balance between strength and flexibility. Indeed, making it to the PGA Tour is such a difficult task that no player--having accomplished that task--would risk throwing it away by upsetting the balance (of strength and flexibility) that helped get them there.

Reason #2. The other thing steroids do for athletes is to decrease the time required for injuries to heal. Evidence that pro golfers are not currently using steroids is the simple fact that every week they withdraw from tournaments (with million-dollar purses) because of seemingly minor injuries of the sort that we 18-handicappers (who have to hold down more conventional jobs) play and work through on a regular basis.

Reason #1. This is the main one. Personal integrity is still at the very heart of golf. Professional golfers invariably report their own infringement of some obscure rule even though no one else would ever have known and even though the resulting penalty can cost them hundreds of thousands of dollars. I guess that's a part of why I'm a golf fan.